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CHAPTER I
PURPOSE, HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY
Purpose
This study focuses on the Disability Insurance Program,
initiated in 1956 as part of the Social Security Program. Dis-
ability insurance has been chosen for analysis since it
provides a unique opportunity for determining the importance
of the states within the federal system in the United States.
As will be noted in greater detail in Chapter III, the Dis-
ability Insurance program is totally funded bv the federal
governmenc and, as the name implies, is an insurance oriented
program. In these particulars it is similar to the Old-Age,
Survivors’ Insurance (OASI) program of which it is a part.
A key corollarv of tlie insurance orientation is that
peonlo receive benefits only if they qualify. (This is in
contrast to the welfare orientation where benefits are
awarded on the basis of need.) Because of the nature of the
program, variations among the states in regard to the per-
centage of claimants granted insurance benefits are supposed
to be nomina] and to relate only to whether the claimant
covered by the program meets the specifications detailing who
is entitled to benefits.
Howevcm
,
the administrative implementation of disabi.lity
insurance differs in one fundamental respect Iroj’.i OASI. Unlike
1
2the latter, the basic decisions regarding who is entitled to
benefits are inade by state agencies. This study proceeds from
the assumption that this arrangemen;. has resulted in the exten-
sion of state influence over the disability program and that
this influence is demonstrated by variance in the allowances
among states.
The purpose of this study then is to determine the
legitimacy of this contention and in so doing to help ascer-
tain what degree of viability the states do have in relation-
ship to the federal government. If it is possible to conclude
that the states do exercise some influence on the ways deci-
sions are made in this program of disability insurance, then
tlie prominence of the states should be self-evident, espe-
cially since such influence will be demonstrated using a
federally funded program as a test case. If, however, the
results of this analysis suggest that state governments have
little or no influence over this program, then one will have
to place limits on the views held by some that the states
remain significantly important in our federal system.
Hypotheses
In order to test tlie basic hypothesis, i.e., that the
states influence the awarding of benefits to disability
claimants, a number of subsidiary hypotheses will be advanced
and tested. These hypotheses follow:
1. Variability in the implementation of the Disability
3Insurance program among the states is an inevitable
result of the existing federal system within the
United States in which the states function as semi-
autonomous polities with active roles to play in
the formulation and implementation of most major
policies .
^
2. The importance of the states in general and v\?ithin
the disability program in particular can be sug-
gested by the history of the establishment of the
program and by the intentions of the policy makers
involved .
3. Variability in the disability insurance program is
influenced by socio-economic characteristics within
the states and by the efforts of the state decision-
makers to respond to the needs implied by those
7
cha rac ter i St i cs
,
4. Variability in the disability program is related to
the degree of inter-party competition in a state.
Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture
(Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1965); William T . Bluhm
,
Ideologies and Attitudes: Modern Political Culture (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc
. ,
1974); Donald J. Devine, The
Political Culture of the United States (Boston: Little, Brown,
and Co
. ,
1972); Daniel Elazar, American Federalism: A View
from the States (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, Co., 1972).
2 See Chapter III below.
3Thomas Dye, Politic s
.
Economics, and the Public: Policy
Outcomes in the Am e rican Stat es (Chicago: Rand McxNally, 1966);
,
Unders t anding Public Policy (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall
,
Inc., 1972); fra Sharkansky, Spending in the Americ an State s
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968).
^Duane Lockard, "State Party Systems and Policy Outputs,"
in Oliver Garceau, ed.. Poli t ical Research and Political Theory .
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press) ; Austin Ranney
,
"Parties in State Politics," in Herbert Jacob and Kennetli V^'ines,
Poli
t
ics in the American Sta tes, 2d ed. (Boston: Little, Brown,
and Co
.
9
1971 ).
45. Variability in the disability program is related to
the degree of voter turnout within a state.
^
6. Variability in the disability program is related to
the strength of interest groups within a state.
^
7. Variability in the disability program is influenced
by the actions of the decision-makers within a state
and by the organizational framework in which such
decision-makers operate. Specifically, the following
associations are suggested as relating to state
variations in the implementation of the Disability
Insurance Program;
a. Variability in the disability program is related
to the degree of legislative professionalism in
7
a state.
b. Variability in the disability program is related
to the degree of gubernatorial effectiveness in
a state.
^
Thomas Dye, Politics in States and Communities (Engle-
wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), pp . 66-70; Lester
Milbrath, "Individuals and Government," in Jacob and Vines.
^Lewis Froman, "Some Effects of Interest Group Strength
in State Politics," American Political Science Review 60
(December, 1966), 952-962; Harmon L. Zeigler and Michael A.
Baer, Lobbying: Interaction and Influence in American State
Legislatures (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co.,
1969)
; ] and Hendrik van Dalen, "Interest Groups in the
States," in Jacob and Vines.
7John G. Grumm, "The Effects of Legislative Structure
on Legislative Performance," in Richard Hofferbert and Ira
Sharka^isky, Sjt ate and Urban Politics: Readings in Comparative
Public Poli cy (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1971); The
Citizens Conference on State Legislatures, State Legislatures:
An Evaluation of Their Effectiveness (New York; Praeger Publishers
T9TTT.
^Thad Beyle and J. Oliver Williams, ed.. The American
Governor in Behavioral Perspecti ve (New York: Harper and Row, 1972
Joseph A. Schiesinger, "The Politics of the Executive," in Jacob
and Vines.
5c. Variability in the disability program is related
to the degree of administrative professionalism
9in a state.
d. Variability in the disability program is related
to the degree of political innovation in a state.
e. Variability in the disability program is related
to the degree of professionalism in the Disability
Determining Units (DDU's), those state agencies
which make the decisions on allowances and denials
of disability benefits to claimants. DDU profes-
sionalism can be further analyzed into the back-
ground and qualification of examiners, and length of
service in the DDU's.
Methodology
In order to test the hypotheses stated above, a variety
of statistical techniques v^^ill be utilized to determine whether
correlations exist between the variables selected. Further-
more, material from several interviews conducted in a number
of states will also assist in making determinations about the
validity of the hypotheses. The use of these techniques and
the nature of interviews will be given more emphasis in later
chapters
.
It is necessary and appropriate at this point, however,
to suggest that the overall methodology which will be utilized
^Ira Sharkansky, "State Administrators in the Political
Process," in Jacob and Vines.
^^Jack Walker, "Innovation in State Politics," in
Jacob and Vines.
6to order the hypotheses presented here is systems analysis.
Systems analysis is an especially useful model for analyzing
the variables in this study because it conceptually incorpor-
ates the variety of factors which have been specified as
possible influence on disability benefit rates and
presents logical relationships of these factors to the dis-
ability allowance percentages. In this sense the systems
model is more comprehensive than other models which have been
suggested in the literature, such as the elite-mass model, the
group model, the institutional model, the rationalist model,
or the incrementalist model. An analysis of the essential
features of each of these other models will demonstrate their
limitations and also point to the general necessity of choosing
the systems model.
Thomas Dye in his review of these models observes that
the elite-mass model is one which is based on the supposition
that public policy (in this study disability benefits) must
be seen as the "preferences and values of a governing elite.
The elite^ which is drawn from the upper socio-economic strata,
may indeed work through the political system and may be "public
regarding." But the basic point is that policy created to
deal with non- elite (or mass) problems is formulated and
‘''Thomas Dye, Understanding Public Policy
,
p. 20.
^^James Q. Wilson and Edward C. Banfield, "Public-
Regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior," American
Political Science Review 58 (December, 1964), 876-887.
7implemented by the elite and not by the non-elite.
One of the attractive features of this model is its
parsimony, i.e., the interrelationships of all of the members
of the polity are placed under the basic concepts of "elite”
and "mass" (or "non- el ite") . Paradoxically, however, it is
this economy of interpretive concepts which tends to vitiate
the usefulness of this model, since it does not account for
the whole range of variables in political reality which might
be hypothesized as factors affecting the types of political
process and specifically public policy in existence in a
particular polity.
The group model, as the name implies, is based on the
contention that the primary concern of analysis should be
the struggle of groups to influence public policy determina-
tion. Government acts as a referee or manager of conflict
among competing groups by setting up certain "rules of the
game," recording compromises between groups in the form of
public policy and enforcing the compromises by its authori-
tative position. Thus public policy is a record of the
"equilibrium" achieved in the contest between groups at any
particular time.
As with the elite-mass model, the single-mindedness
of this approach is appealing. However,^ it suffers from the
same deficiencies (at least as far as this study is concerned)
as the elite-mass model. The effort to subsume all of politica
Thomas Dye, Understanding , p. 23 .
8reality under the concept "group” and particularly "interest
group" produces dubious results since the membership of
interest groups in the United States is a rather small portion
of the total citizenry.
The institutional model rests on the common sense
notion that public policy emanates from governmental insti-
tutions, i.e., it is "authoritatively determined, implemented,
and enforced by governmental institutions."^^ As Thomas Dye
states, institutions may be so structured as to facilitate
certain policy outcomes and to obstruct other policy out-
comes." Certain interests may receive more favorable
attention than others because of the structure of an insti-
tution. Although the institutional model complements the two
previous models, once again the lack of comprehensiveness in
the approach makes it difficult for the researcher to cover
adequately the complex of potential explanatory variables.
Tlie other models for explaining policy bear a close
relationship to the institutional framework. The "rational-
ist" model may be described most accurately as an "ideal" or
"pure" type construction which proposes a way to arrive at
"rational" decisions and public policies. A rational policy
is one v;hich is designed to maxim.ize "net value achievement,"
which is attained when all the "relevant values" of a society
are known and sacrifices and deprivations of one value are
compensated for by the achieA^ement of greater maximization of
15 Ibid
. ,
p . 32 .
16 Ibid
. ,
p . 33
9another value. The assumptions on which the pure model is
based are of course several, ranging from the ability to
perceive tl'e values of all persons throughout the society,
the ab ility to predict the consequences of particular policy
implementations beforehand, and even the allowance by the
citizenry of the "rational decision-making" procedures to be
followed . ^ ^
Arguing against these assumptions, the incrementalist
theorists have contended that there are no commonly held
societal goals for each particular policy area, and that
specific individuals and groups hold differing views and
values Avhich engender the conflict which is the basis of
politics. The incrementalists argue that policy is primarily
a continuation of previous policy decisions. Policy makers
accept the "legitimacy" of existing programs and focus their
attention upon the "incremental" increases or modifications
of the base program. Constraints on human intelligence, on
available time, and on available resources and finances all
tend to preclude the decision-maker from expanding the
necessary resources to arrive at a "rational" decision on
every policy pioposal.
Both the rationalist and incrementalist models bear
a close relationship to the institutionalist approach, focus-
ing as they do on the decision-maker himself as an integral
unit within the institutional structure of the political
17 Ibid., pp . 27 - 30
.
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system. Since both of these models may be subsumed under
the institutional schema, the same criticisms apply to them
that were pointed to regarding the institutional model.
What is needed is not a model which has a narrow focus but
one which can encompass within its conceptual framework all
of the relationships and structures emphasized by the other
models
.
It is then the limited nature of each of these models
which, as indicated at the outset of the discussion, leads
one, for the purposes of this study, to the adoption of the
systems model. The systems framework, as elaborated by David
Easton, assumes that the political system, consisting of the
decision-makers and the institutional framework within which
they operate, determine public policy according to the in-
1
8
fluences on the political system. Easton conceptualizes
the political system as a set of interactions among the
members of a society concerned with the "authoritative alloca-
tion of values" for the society at large. Thus, the author-
itative allocation of values is, for Easton, the function
which distinguishes the political system from the other
systems of society (e.g., social system, economic system)
that constitute tiie environment of the political system.
Since a political system operates within a social and
economic environment and develops w'ithin an historical time
dimension, it is appropriate in this study of state decision-
^^David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life
(Nev.’ York: Wiley, 196 5).
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making in the Disability Insurance program to assess the
impact of these environmental influences upon the establish-
ment and mode of implementation of the program. These
environmental factors include; (1) the political context of
federalism in which the states, functioning as semi- autonomous
polities, have an active role to play in the formulation and
implementation of policies established by the federal govern-
ment; (2) the historical development of the federal system
during which precedents were sufficiently established to
assure the states a major role in the implementation of most
federal programs; and (3) the social economic characteristics
of the populations within each of the states. These factors
then constitute the environment for the political system as
it operates in regard to this particular program. Hypotheses
1-3 on pages 2 and 3 of this chapter indicate the expected
relationships between these factors of the environment and the
actions of the state political systems in responding through
the implementation of the Disability Insurance program.
The systems model indicates further that inputs in
the form of demands and supports emerge from the environment
and exert pressures upon the political system to which the
latter must respond. Since the "values" to be allocated by
the political system are normally scarce, decisions as to
their authoritative allocation have to be made which will
not satisfy all groups within the society to the same extent.
The "demands" on the political system from the environment
12
thus represent the claims of the members of the society upon
the system. Hypotheses 4-6 listed on pages 3 and 4 of this
chapter indicate the nature of the input demands into the
political system that are expected to be associated with
particular responses from the system.
Finally, systems analysis is concerned with those
elements of the political system itself which could have a,
potential effect on the types of responses made by the decision-
makers. Here the purpose is to ascertain those features of
the political system which might structure the types of
decisions made by state personnel determining whether or not
to award allowances to disability claimants. Systems analysis
provides an opportunity for ascertaining the flexibility of
the political system in responding to the influences from the
environment and the pressures on decision-makers from, the
various inputs. Hypothesis 7, together with its several
subsidiary hypotheses, listed on pages 4 and 5 of this chapter,
provides some tent at ive guidelines for thinking about the
relationships of political system characteristics and the
resultant types of policy implementation.
The further elaboration of the particular aspects of
the environment, inputs, and political system itself and their
relationships to the implementation of the Disability Insurance
program will be presented in the following chapters. Chapter
II will consist of a discussion of the importance of political
federalism as environmental influences upon theculture and
13
operations of the state political systems. It will be
argued that since the states do in fact participate in a
federal system, their influence upcn policy decisions is
almost inevitable, even in those cases where programs are
completely funded by the federal government. Chapter III
discusses the history of the Social Security program in
general and the Disability Insurance program in particular
in order to demonstrate the importance of the states in
determining the manner in which the policies were to be
implemented. In the specific case of the Disability Insur-
ance program, it will be shown that the states, because of
their prominent positions within the federal system, were
allowed to play a role in the administrative decision-making
process of the program. In Chapter IV there will be an
analysis of the social economic variables and their impact
upon the types of decisions made by the state disability
determining agencies responsible for the implementat i.on of
the program. Specifically, the purpose of this chapter will
be to determine which of the socio-economic variables dis-
cussed are most important in explaining the ratio of allowance
to denial rates among the states. Chapter V will deal with
the input variables and will indicate any relationships
existent between them and the variability in the percentages
of disability benefits awarded to claimants among the states.
In Chapter Vi the analysis will focus on the political system
variables and will include a discussion of the actuaJ. adm.in
istrative operations of the Disability Insurance program in
14
the states. Of particular importance here will be the effect
of the institutional framework within which administrators
have to make decisions concerning the awarding of disabilit>
benefits to claimants. Chapter VII will conclude this study
with an evaluation of the analysis in terms of the hypotheses
indicated at the beginning of this chapter. Here the major
concern will be to discuss the validity of the primary
hypothesis of this study, i.e., that the states do in fact
play a role in the administration of a federally funded
program simply because of their central position within the
federal system of the United States.
CHAPTER I I
AMERICAN FEDERALISM:
THE ROLE OF THE STATES IN THE AMERICAN POLITY
The Foundations of Federalism
in American Political Culture
Although this study is in great part a case study of
the role of the states in the implementation of a specific
program, it is intended that the research be firmly rooted
in the overall subject of federalism in the United States.
For this reason this chapter will focus on the general topic
of federalism itself and the attempts of scholars to eluci-
date its principal features. The purported importance of
federalism leads one to inquire why the essential elements of
federalism, i.e., division of governmental powers between
federal and state governments and the consequent viability of
the states as semi- autonomous political systems, continue to
be maintained nearly two hundred years after the inst itut?>.on
of federalism in the United States.
It is aigued here that the resiliency of federalism
in the United States may be attributed to the type of
political culture which is predomiiiant in America. Altnough
the discussion of federalism and of the history of the Social
Security and Disability Insurance programs will point to the
importance of political culture in shaping both the govern-
15
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mental tradition and the manner of implementing particular
governmental programs, some discussion of the essential
features cf American political culture might be useful here.
Most scholars seem to agree that American political
culture can be defined as essentially the "liberal tradition."
This "liberal tradition" consists basically of a set of
beliefs and values, shaped by historical experience and the
environmental conditions in which they developed, which
emphasize the importance of the individual as the primary
unit of political society and his well-being as the objective
of social and political existence. This emphasis on the
individual in the American tradition has resulted in a ten-
sion between the notion of Individualism and the concept of
limited government on the one hand, and the idea of popular
sovereignty and a more collectivist view of the polity on
the other.
^
Tracing its historical roots, William Bluhm indicates
that "individualism appeared first as the individualism of
men of property, in good Lockean fashion; this was an indivi-
dualism which implied in the political realm the denial of all
absolute power, no matter where vested- -which implied, in
^On the importance of American political culture in
terms of the shaping of the American polity, see the following
William T. Bluhm, Ideologies and Attitudes: Modern Political
Cul t ure (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974);
Donalcf^J. Devine, The Political Culture of th e United States
(Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1972); esp. pp . 47-65; Louis
Hartz, The Libera l Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt
,
Brace, and World, 19 5 5T~!
17
short, constitutional government."^ This belief found
concrete expression in the American Constitution of 1789,
mechanisms for balancing powers and providing for
mutual checks among the branches of government. James
Madison indicated the concern of the Founding Fathers with
the problem of limited government when he wrote in The
Federal i s
t
. In framing a government which is to be adminis-
tered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this:
you must first enable the government to control the governed
and in the next place oblige it to control itself."^
The notion of popular sovereignty in the American
tradition was emphasized by Thomas Jefferson. In contrast
to Madison, Jefferson argued that "the law of the majority
is the natural law of every society of men."^ He defined
a "republic" as a "government by its citizens in mass,
controlling directly and personally, according to the rules
established by the majority."^ Furthermore, Jefferson was
less interested in preserving the same Constitution for an
indefinite period of time, and insisted that each new
generation would have to remake the fundamental institutions
of government to suit the will of the majority at that time.
- B 1uhm
.
I deologies and Attitudes
,
p . 71.
' i 0^ . , p . 7 1
.
^Ibid., p. 72.
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As Jefferson wrote:
We may consider each generation as a distinct nation
with a right, by the will of the majority, to bind
themselves, but not to bind the succeeding genera-
tions. ...
The idea that institutions established for the use of
the nation cannot be touched nor modified
. . . may
perhaps be a salutary provision against the abuses of
a monarch, but is most absurd against the nation itself.^
This emphasis on popular sovereignty and majority will
ni3^riifests a more positive orientation to the role of govern-
ment in a society or at least to the ability and right of
the people through majority expression to designate the type
of government which is most desirable at the time.
Throughout the history of the American republic, the
principles of limited government (individualism) and popular
sovereignty (collectivism) have remained central elements in
American political culture. Alternating between periods of
relative harmony and more pronounced conflict, they have
7
nevertheless run in "counterpoint" to one another, albeit
with varying degrees of harmony and disharmony.
Since the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, the individualist element in the American politica
culture has been on the decline from its position of relative
predominance in the early and middle nineteenth century.
Movements such as Populism in the 1890s and Progressivism in
the early 1900s sought to emphasize the collective-popular
sovereignty element and were in varying degrees opposed to
^^Ibid_.
,
p. 72. ^Ibid. , p. 73.
19
V
the individualistic principle. Although the latter achieved
a revival during the 1920s, after the inception of the
Depression and the beginning of the New Deal, the positive
role of government in the establishment of justice and promo-
tion of general welfare and economic security became the
predominant theme in American political culture.
It is important to remember, however, that the two
principles of limited government and popular sovereignty
continue to exist in a dynamic counterpoint. As will be
pointed out in the chapter on the history of the Social
Security programs, the notion of limited government influenced
decision-makers in the way various social service programs
were formulated and designed for administration. In particu-
lar, the states were given substantially more responsibility
in these programs than one might suspect if one considered
only the influence of the popular sovereignty element in
American political culture.
In the larger context than the formulation of any one
program or group of programs, the two basic elements of
American political culture have been important in preserving
a federal system in the United States. Both the tendency to
extreme decentralization and extreme centralization have been
avoided as a result of the counterpoint between antagonistic
principles. That both types of influences are necessary for
8 Ibid., pp. 76-77.
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the proper functioning of a federal system can best be seen
by analyzing the concept of federalism itself and summarizing
the major findings of American political scientists on the
nature of federalism in the United States.
The Influence of the States
in American Federalism
The idea of a federal polity has been one of the
"basic symbols of the American political tradition."^ Both
political actors and students of politics have used this
symbol over the years to characterize the kind of political
structure and network of relationships among the institutions
of that structure which constitutes the American political
system. To foreign observers also, the American system has
become the archetype of the modern federal polity.
Since the idea of federalism has been so central
to an understanding of the American way of government, there
has been no dearth of attempts among scholars to identify the
essential characteristics of this phenomenon. Perhaps one
of the more suggestive offerings is one which is presented
by Daniel Elazar. He has written that federalism is a
kind of political order animated by political principles
that emphasize the primacy of bargaining and negotiated
coordination among several power centers as a prelude
to the exercise of power within a single political system,
Q
Willmoore Kendall and George Carey, The Basic
Syn^ols o f th e American Political Tradition (Baton Rouge:
Loiiisiana State University Press, 1970).
21
and stress the value of dispersed power centers as a
means for safeguarding individual and local liberties
.
As Elazar's definition suggests, the notion of a
political order animated by political principles" implies
a set of distinct characteristics which must be manifested
in a particular political system before the label "federal"
may be legitimately applied. The most important of these
principles is that of "non-centralization."^^ An essential
characteristic of any federal polity is the presence of
viable subnational political systems within the national
polity itself, even though the national system retains the
authority to govern in prescribed matters for the whole
political society. It is this element of "noncentralization"
or "the structured dispersion of power among many centers
whose legitimate authority is constitutionally guaranteed"^“
that serves primarily to distinguish a federal system from
both the "confederal" and "unitary" types, in which either
the constituent political systems or the national system
exercises all of the legitimate authority.
Within this context, then, it is important to dis-
tinguish between the notions of "non- central i zation" and
"decentralization" as defining characteristics of political
''^'Daniel Elazar, "Federalism," International Encycl o-
pedia of tn e Soc ial .Sciences
, 5, p. 5 547
^
^ Dan i e 1 Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the
Stat es, 2nd cd. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co
. ,
197 2) , p. 3.
^"Daniel Elazar, "Federalism and Intergovernmental
Relations," in Elazar, ct al
. ,
cds
. ,
Cooperation and Conflict
(Itasca, Illinois: F.E. Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1969).
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systems. Decentralization is a term that is often erroneously
used to describe the relationships between the national and
constituent political systems in a federal polity. The
clearest explication of the difference between these two
concepts is made by Daniel Elazar. He observes that:
Decentralization implies the existence of a central
authority having a legitimate monopoly of governmental
power which can concentrate, devolve, or reconcen-
trate functions more or less as it pleases but which
generally chooses the middle course. Non- centraliza-
tion (the keystone of every true federal system)
,
on
the other hand, implies the constitutional coexistence
of a general government and governments with more
particularized authority which share governmental
power
.
Thus, within a decentralized political system, there is a
substantially greater investment of power made in the central
government than one finds within a federal political system.
Although, as Elazar points out, the central government may
well decide to devolve a number of political functions to
the lower level governments, there is no guarantee that this
will be the case. In effect, in a decentralized system of
government, the extent to which the interests of the local
political entities are taken into consideration rests solely
upon the effectiveness of local representatives in the central
government
.
However, within a non- central i zed political system,
both the central, or more precisely ’’general,” government and
13 Ibid
. ,
pp
.
18 - 19 .
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the constituent governments have a substantial share of
legitimate authority to govern. As Elazar discusses this
type of governmental arrangement: "In the non-centralized
American system, there is no central government with
absolute authority over the states in the unitary sense, but
there is a strong national government coupled with strong
state governments that share authority and power, consti-
tutionally and practically." This same conception of the
non-centralized American federal system of government has
also been very well expressed by Justice Salmon Chase in a
decision which he wrote for the Supreme Court in the case of
Texas v. White in 1869:
The preservation of the States, and the maintenance
of their governments, are as much within the design
and care of the Constitution as the preservation of
the Union and the maintenance of the National govern-
ment. The Constitution, in all of its provisions,
looks to an indestructible Union, composed of in-
destructible States.
Thus, the concept of non-centralization may serve as a short-
hand method of characterizing one of the principal features
of a federal polity--"the value of dispersed power centers as
17
a means for safeguarding individual and local liberties."
It is within this overall context of non- central! zat ion in
the formal institutional structure of the federal system
^^Ibid.
,
p. 3.
^^Texas v . Wh ite, 7 Wall. 700 (1869).
^"^Elazar, "Federalism," lESS
,
p. 354 .
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that Elazar posits the principles of "negotiated coordination"
or the 'primacy of bargaining." These principles serve as
the essential defining characteristics of Elazar's notion of
partnership." Whereas the notion of non-centralization
refers primarily to the constitutional arrangements between
the levels of government within the federal system, the
concept of "partnership" points beyond the constitutional
framework of governance to the actual political arrangements
and activities which characterize the federal polity as it
engages in political action. As Elazar comments; "Partnership
implies the distribution of real power among the several
centers that must negotiate cooperative arrangements with
one another in order to achieve common goals.
The features of negotiation and bargaining have
become topics of special concern to political scientists
studying federalism within the United States. Scholars have
undertaken studies to explore the multifaceted arrangements
which manifest the cooperative nature of the American political
system. However, it is important to realize that, although
scholars have long realized that the American federal system
is a model of a non- central i zed polity, they have not until
quite recently appreciated the complex nature of the insti-
tutional network through which "negotiated coordination"
takes place.
^^Elazar, "Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations."
^^Elazar, American Federalism, p. 3.
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The change in perspective of political scientists
toward the actual workings of the American federal system
has been highlighted by the use of the concepts of "dual
federalism" and "cooperative federalism" to distinguish the
two most important theories of the political functioning
of the federal institutions in the United States. The con-
troversy over the most adequate conceptualization of the
federal system, i.e., over the question of "dual federalism"
versus "cooperative federalism," has emerged from the dif-
ferent aspects of the functioning federal system which have
been studied by the proponents of the two models. Scholars
who proposed the dual federalism model emphasized the
cons t i tut ional and legal aspects of the federal structure
rather than focusing on the actual functions performed by
the various levels of the political system or on the various
behaviors exhibited by the political actors. The result of
this situation was tliat political scientists produced a
number of studies on the "constitutional basis" of the
American "partnership," but unfortunately there remained a
dearth of material on the actual operations of the federal
system
.
More recencly, political scientists have tended to
focus on the hitherto neglected aspects of federal-state
relationships. Studies have been undertaken tc analyze such
areas as political, administrative, fiscal, judicial, and
personnel interactions between the two lev'^els of govern-
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ment. Subsequent to this broadening of the scope of
investigations into the operations of the federal system,
scholars gradually have replaced the idea of dual federalism
by that of cooperative federalism.
In order to understand the differences between the
two approaches and to see how the latter theory has modified
the former, it will be useful to present a summary analysis
of the most important findings of the proponents of the
dual federalism model. The central thesis of this theory was
that the federal and state systems, besides being structur-
ally autonomous and independent of one another in terms of
laws, electoral procedures, personnel, and so forth, also
perform different types of services for their respective
communities. Public policies are formulated and implemented
by each level of the political system to solve particular
problems but there is no continuous interaction between them
to determine the most suitable type of policy or service for
the perceived problems. Any federal-state interaction per-
ceived by the proponents of this theory rested almost solely
on constitutional questions regarding the relationships between
the federal and state governments that were adjudicated by
the state and federal courts.
During the late nineteenth century, when this partic-
ular view was most prevalent, James Bryce, in his classic work
7 n
'^^See the essays in the collection edited by Daniel
h'Jazai’, et al., American federalism , and also Publius: Journa l
of Federalism.
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The American Commonwealth
,
summarized the essential fea-
tures of tliis conception of American federalism as follows:
The characteristic feature and special interest of
the American Union is that it shows us two govern-
ments covering the same ground, yet distinct and
separate in their action. It is like a great fac-
tory wherein two sets of machinery are at work, their
revolving wheels apparently intermixed, their bands
crossing one another, yet each set doing its o\,rn
work without touching or hampering the other. 21
As late as the early 1950s, Professor Leonard White could
write in a work on the relationship betAveen the states and
the federal government that, early in the nineteenth century,
" a dual system of government and administration emerged,
each level independent in its own sphere and operating without
let or hindrance from, the other, each supported by revenues
2 7
of which it held full command."
Thus, the predominant opinion of scholars for several
decades was that the American federal system, for the greater
part of its history, consisted of a set of autonomous
political institutions performing separate functions in an
independent manner for one political society. Many of these
scholars, however, who wrote during and subsequent to the
Depression of the 1930s, sensed a marked change in the
institutional arrangements of the federal structure during
this time period. No longer Av^as the federal structure
? 1
James Bryce, The American Commonwealth (3rd rev. ed.
New York: Macmillan and Co., 189 57"^ T, p. 318.
^
^'Leonard White, The States and the Nation , excerpted
in Daniel Rlazar, et al.. Cooperation and Conflict , pp. 46-47.
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assumed to be one of pure dual federalism. Political scien-
tists such as Jane Perry Clark, in TJie Rise of a New Feder-
2 3
a 1 i s
m
,
and George C. S. Benson, in The New Centralization ,^'^
noted both the increasing tendency of the federal and state
government to cooperate in the administration of policies and
also the tendency of the federal government to take the
initiative in policy formation, even in areas which had
supposedly until that time been the concern of the state
governments. Although the authors differed somewhat in their
evaluations of these new tendencies, Benson being more
apprehensive about the future role of the states in a more
"centralized” system, these two works point to the increasing
concern of political scientists in the late thirties and early
forties to investigate the actual functioning of the American
federal system.
The view that the new orientation of the federal
government might have adverse consequences continued into
the 1950s and is very evident in White's remarks on the
future of the states in his book on The States and the
Nation . White observed that, "if present trends continue
^^Jane Perry Clark, The R is e of a New F ede ralism :
Federal State Cooperation in the United States (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1938).
George C. S. Benson, Th e New Central i zation: A
Study of Interg overnmental R ionships in the United
States (T'lew York'. FQnehart and Co., 1941) .
^
^Leonard White, The States and the Na tion (Baton
Route: Louisiana State University Press, 1953).
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for another quarter century, the states may be left hollow
shells, operating primarily as the field districts of federal
departments and dependent upon the federal treasury for their
2 6support." He explained the emergence of this new type of
federal relationship in terms of the increasing complexity of
modern industrial America, of the increasing welfare services
provided since the inception of the New Deal, and of the
desire of federal administrative officials to properly over-
see the management of their programs by state officials.
Thus, until as recently as the last two decades,
scholars were generally agreed that a system of dual federal-
ism had prevailed in the American political system from the
early nineteenth century until about the time of the New Deal.
In characterizing the period from the 1930s to the 1950s,
there seemed to be a consensus that changes had been made
in the general relationships of the federal and state govern-
ments, but there was no firm conclusion on the effects of
these changes on the role of the states in the federal system.
During the last several years, substantial empirical
research has been done on the nature of the federal system
in the United States and many, if not most, of the older
conclusions about the historical arrangements of the American
political institutions and the development of federalism
since the New Deal have been called into question. Scholars
working in this area now view their task as one of investi-
"^Leonard White in Elazar, Conflict and Cooperation, p. 45.
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gating as rigorously as possible all of the multifaceted
political, administrative, judicial, and financial arrange-
ments which constitute the operating federal system in the
United States.
One of the leaders of this new group of investigators
was Professor Morton Grodzins, whose influential essay on
The American System" proposed a new model of federal
- state
relations. Grodzins argued that, in regard to the imple-
mentation of policy or performance of services, "functions
are not neatly parceled out among the many governments. They
are shared functions. It is difficult to find any govern-
mental activity which does not involve all three of the so-
called ’levels’ of the federal system." In a direct
challenge to the former conception of the history of American
federalism, Grodzins wrote that "the American federal system
has never been a system of separated governmental activities.
There has never been a time when it was possible to put neat
7 qlabels on discrete ’federal,’ ’state,’ and ’local’ functions.""
The research to substantiate these claims has been
carried out during the past several years by several political
scientists. One scholar who has done much to develop and
elaborate upon the work of Grodzins is Daniel Elazar. Elazar
has centered his studies upon the general concept of coopera-
“ Morton Grodzins, "The Federal System," in Charles
Press and Oliver P. Williams, ed.
,
Democracy in the Fifty
States (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).
28 Ibid., p . 38
29 Ibid., pp. 40-41.
31
tion or collaboration, which ho finds to be a ubiquitous
feature of the functioning federal system in the United
States. As he conceptualizes it:
Cooperative, or collaborative federalism can be
defined as the sharing of responsibilities for given
functions by the federal and state governments. In
this sense, it is conceived to be the opposite of
dual federalism, which implies a division of func-
tions between governments as well as a division of
governmental structures. Although the theory of
cooperative federalism assumes a division of struc-
tures, it accepts a system of sharing that ranges from
formal federal
- state agreements covering specific
programs to informal contracts on a regular basis
for the sake of sharing information and experience."^
It is clear from this definition that the proponents
of the cooperative federalism model do retain a major aspect
of the older dual federalism theory. There is a basic agree-
ment that the states exist as relatively autonomous political
systems within an overall national polity. Thus, in both
accounts, the central feature of any federal system, non-
centralization, is given primary attention.
The fundamental criticism of the dual federal model
by those who perceive the American system to be a set of
cooperative ariangements focuses on the degree to which the
states and national government are able to practice an autono-
mous politics, relatively free of influence from other levels
of the political system. On the one hand, scholars who
proposed the dual federalism model argued that both national
“’^Daniel Elazar, The American Partnership: Inter -
governmental Cooperation i n the Nineteenth Century United
^
^
S t a t e s (Chicago": University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 305.
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and state political systems indeed did carry out political
functions relatively independent of one another. However,
proponents of the cooperative federalism model argue that in
virtually no area of political action are the federal and
state political systems autonomous in their formulation
and implementation of public policy.
Such a model as cooperative federalism presupposes
a whole array of institutionalized relationships between the
federal and state polities within which the sharing or coopera-
tive process takes place. In its most generalized form, the
typical cooperative relationship manifests itself, according
to Elazar, as follows:
The federal government, the states, and the localities
share the burden for the great domestic programs by
making the larger governments primarily responsible
for raising revenues and setting standards, and the
smaller ones primarily responsible for administering
the programs. For each program, all governments
involved contribute toward making policy in ways that
often depend upon the forms of sharing involved.
The forms of sharing have changed and multiplied
during the development of the American polity. A comprehen-
sive examination of the multifaceted aspects of the sharing
process in the American system is beyond the scope of this
paper. Attention will be focused primarily upon some of the
basic formal and informal arrangements which the federal and
state governments have devised during the past few decades.
The multiplication of governmental functions and
^^Daniel Elazar, American Federalism, pp . 47-48.
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various forms of cooperation may be viewed as the prolonged
effort of the political systems of both the federal and
state levels to respond to the social and economic problems
inherent in an industrialized society. On the most general
level, this expanding role of the governmental sector mani-
fests itself as an increase in the "velocity of government
,
or "the amount of governmental activity in relation to the
•z 7.
total activity of society."
It is important to realize, however, that a history
of institutionalized cooperative federal relationships
helped to shape the structure of the particular responses
made by the political system to the various social and
economic problems which it confronted. In the late nine-
teenth century and even more during the first three decades
of the twentieth century, it became increasingly clear that
the state political systems alone could not respond with
sufficient resources to provide adequate services for the
poor, aged, unemployed, and disabled, whose numbers increased
under the impact of the rapid growing economic system. With-
in the context of an operating dual federal system, the
pressures toward complete federal control over domestic
service programs would have been far more intense than was
possible within the confines of a pre-existing cooperative
federal structure. Thus, as Elazar points out, the twentieth
32 33Ibid
.
,
. 50. Ibid.
,
p . 50
.
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century has witnessed federal intervention in various
policy areas as a means for stimulating and supplementing
rather than preempting state action as would have been the
case under a dual federal system.
One of the most prominent examples of the stimulating
rather than preempting character of federal action has been
the development of the grants - in- aid programs. Grant s
- in- aid
consist of federal transfers of funds to state governments
and federal and state transfers of funds to local governments
for specific purposes which are agreed upon by the govern-
ments participating in the program. Grants are normally
subject to a measure of supervision and review by the granting
government. The grant-in-aid programs developed greatly in
this century, when, from 1911 to 1965, sixty-five new federal
3 5programs of this sort were established. Although at times
these types of programs have been considered to be solely
formulated and supervised by the federal government, it is
more correct to state that grant-in-aid programs have been
essentially federal in nature, i.e., involving both the
federal and state governments in cooperative efforts. Federal
regulations have been designed essentially to stimulate the
state governments toward more professional administrative
organization and to increase the likelihood that state admin-
istrators might participate as partners with their professional
^^Ibid.
,
p. 51.
'Daniel Elazar, et al., ^operation and Conflict ,
p. 12.
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counterparts within the federal agencies.
In the typical grant-in-aid program, in fact, each
state is left the responsibility for planning the program,
preparing the necessary budgets, enacting appropriate legis-
lation, and providing funds for the implementation of the
specific program. Although federal requirements do exist,
in the form of Congressional enactment and the administrative
regulations stipulated by the federal agencies, the state
political systems have a number of opportunities to influence
the actual policy making process in this type of program.
Because of the number of grant-in-aid programs that
have been established in the United States, political
scientists have tended to concentrate their study of the
cooperative elements of the American federal system in this
particular area. However, those programs which do not neatly
fall into this particular type of grant-in-aid category also
merit considerably more study than has been undertaken until
now
.
One example of such a neglected policy area is that
of the federal Disability Insurance program, enacted in 1956.
Unlike the federal grant-in-aid categories, the Disability
Insurance program is a policy area in which the federal
^Daniel Elazar, American Federalism
,
pp. 160-171;
also cf. Jerome T. Murphy, "The Education Bureaucracies
Implement Novel Policy: The Politics of Title I of ESEA,
1965-1972," in Allan P. Sindler, Policy and Politics in
America: Six Case Studies (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co.,
1973) .
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government appropriates all of the funds and stipulates all
of the regulations for the implementation of the program.
However, vvithin this framework, the states are authorized to
administer the program themselves
. Thus, as with grant-
programs, both the federal and state governments
have a role to play in the implementation of the policy. In
such a case, there exists a potential for cooperative
relations between the federal and state administrative
agencies in regard to the formulation of decision-making
criteria and in regard to the actual execution of the policy
within the individual states. One would not expect the states,
in this type of program, to exercise the freedom of decision-
making possible within a grant-in-aid program. However, the
extent to which cooperative relations do exist between the
federal and state governments within the Disability Insurance
program and the exact nature of that cooperation should be
investigated in order to determine how the institutional
structure of a federal polity might affect the way in which
a particular policy is formulated and implemented. One
might ask, for example, how much of a role did tlie states,
by the virtue of their key place within the federal system,
play in the original formulation of the Disability Insurance
program? What kinds of influence do the states have presently
^^See Chapter III for the details on the relation-
ship between the federal and state governments in the Dis-
ability Insurance program.
37
over the actual decision-making processes in this policy-
area?
To set the framev:ork for the analysis of the operation
of the federal Disability Insurance program, the next chapter
will concentrate on the historical development of the various
programs under the Social Security Act and the relationship
of the disability program to these grant-in-aid programs.
This analysis will afford an opportunity to study more closely
the actual process of formulation and implementation of
policies within a cooperative federal system.
CHAPTER I I I
DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL SECURITY AND
DISABILITY INSUR.i\NCE PROGRAMS
Introduction
The depression of the 1930s had a major impact upon
the development of American federalism. The events of this
period illustrate well the tendencies for cooperation and
partnership among the levels of government even in a period
of serious political and economic stress. Furthermore, they
exemplify the role of American political culture, in partic-
ular the counterpoint of individualism and popular sovereignty,
which affects the orientations of decisions makers and acts
to preserve the system of cooperative relations between the
states and the federal government and to keep them in
balance
.
The duration and intensity of the economic turmoil
of that period was unprecedented in the nation's history.
Unemployment had begun to rise as early as 1928 and 1929.
By April 1930 the number of persons out of work had increased
to 3.8 million members of the civilian labor force. This
steady rise in the number of people unemployed reached its
peak in 1933
,
when m.ore than 15 million people, or 28 percent
of the civilian labor force, had no jobs.^ During this same
^Ilelen Clarke, Socia l Legislation (2nd ed.; New York:
Appieton-Ccnturv-Crof ts
,
1957), p. 524.
38
39
time period, from 1929 to 1933, the gross national product
dropped from 181.8 billion dollars to 126.6 billion. Only
in 1939 did the GNP again reach its previous 1929 level,
although the population of the country had grown by nine
million during that period.^
As the depression worsened and its economic effects
continued to produce financial insecurity for millions of
people, growing numbers of public officials realized that the
existing public programs providing relief for the indigent
were decidedly inadequate. Up to this period the responsi-
bility for assisting those persons with severe problems of
economic insecurity rested largely with the states and their
local subdivisions, and with private organizations.
Many explanations have been offered to account for
the slow development of public welfare institutions in this
country. Throughout the greater portion of the nineteenth
century, agriculture, except in the South, was carried on
basically by independent farmers on their own land. Economic
dependence on the fluctuations of the business cycle was
thereby kept to a minimum. In those areas where industriali-
zation was rapidly developing, economic growth was usually
sufficient to absorb the growing population. When periodic
7 ' ...
"Gaston Rimlinger, Welfa re Policy and Industrialization
in Europe, America, and Russi a (New York: Wiley, 1971), p. 196.
^Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Regulating
the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare (Nev; York: Vintage
Books
,
1971), p. 45.
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economic distress did occur, it was not ordinarily serious
enough to lead to major political disorder.^ Furthermore,
until the late nineteenth century, the frontier served to
drain off a substantial number of those who were discontented
in the urban areas.
^
These factors helped to bolster the belief, prevalent
in the United States throughout the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, in economic individualism, which
placed great emphasis on the individual as the sole protec-
tor of his own economic security. One writer has remarked,
in a comparative study of the development of economic security
legislation in a number of countries, that "in the United
States the commitment to individualism, to individual achieve-
ment and self-help, was much stronger than in England or in
France. The survival of the liberal tradition, therefore,
was found to be stronger and the resistance to social pro-
tection more tenacious."^ Poverty therefore came to be
regarded in the United States as "the obvious consequence of
sloth and sinfulness. . . . The promise of America was not
affluence, but independence; not ease, but a chance to work
for oneself, to be self-supporting, and to win esteem through
7hard and honest labor."
^ Ibid
.
,
p. 46.
^ Ibid
.
,
p .' 46.
^Rimlinger, p. 62.
”piven and Cloward, p. 46.
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Throughout the nineteenth century, private charity
organizations handled the majority of the cases of destitu-
tion and old-age. Public institutions such as almshouses and
poor farms provided relief for those not helped by the
8private agencies. These public agencies were financed and
operated by local communities with virtually no assistance
from the state or federal governments.^
Public Assistance Before 1955
To supplement the public aid provided by the alms-
houses on the local level, a number of state governments
adopted programs which would provide cash payments to the
indigent. One of the major categories of the cash payment
program was public assistance. Public assistance programs
were designed to provide monetary payments on a monthly or
semi-monthly basis to those persons who could meet the
requirements of financial need stipulated in the specific
state programs. The two major public assistance programs
adopted by the states before the depression were Aid to the
Blind (AB) and Old Age Assistance (OAA) . In regard to AB
public assistance, Illinois enacted the first program in
1903, and by 1934, 24 states had adopted similar programs.
O
Rimlinger, p. 63.
^ Ibid
.
,
p . 63
.
^ H i 1 a ry M . L ey en d e c k e , Problems and Policy in
Public Assistance (New York: Harper, 1955), p. 54.
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After Montana established the first OAA program in 1923,
several states enacted similar legislation. By 1934 (one
year prior to the adoption of the Social Security Act)
,
there
were 28 states vv'ith OAA programs.
These public assistance programs stipulated several
requirements that potential recipients had to meet in order
to receive assistance. Provisions for length of residence
of an applicant, his level of income, and condition of non-
support by relatives or private agencies varied from one
program to another
,
but generally tended to exclude a large
number of people because of the stringency of the require-
.
12
ments
.
Local administrative agencies in the counties and
cities implemented the public assistance programs and were
given great latitude by the state governments in actual
1
3
policy-making decisions. However, to a great extent the
effectiveness of an assistance program such as OAA or AB
depended on the existence of financial participation by the
states. In many instances the local communities did not have
sufficient resources to enable them to provide public assis-
tance without substantial financial support from the state
.
14
go ve rnments
.
^^ Ibid
.
,
p. 54.
^
^Robert J. Myers, Social Insurance and Allied Govern -
ment Programs (Homewood, 111.: R.D. Irwin, 1965), pp . 11-13.
'•^Ibid.
,
pp. 11-13. ^^Leyendecker , p. 55.
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The states which had adopted the OAA and AB assis-
tance programs were not equally committed to providing
sufficient funds to the local governments to enable the
latter to assist effectively those persons who would other-
wise meet the requirements for receiving OAA or AB assis-
tance. In 1934, only seventeen of the twenty-four states
with AB assistance legislation had any form of state aid to
supplement the expenditures of the local governments. Of
the twenty-eight states with OAA programs, only sixteen were
financed in part with state aid, although six of these states
had programs totally financed by the state governments.^^
Thus, many of the pre-depression state public assistance
programs were more symbolic in nature than substantive.
Social Insurance Before 1935
Before the enactment of the Social Security Act of
1935, social insurance programs were established largely by
private organizations in order to provide financial aid to
workers who had become unemployed. One of the major types
of social insurance programs instituted during this period
was unemployment compensation insurance. This programt was
established on a voluntary basis and was administered by
private agencies. A Bureau of Labor Statistics study
published in 1931 concluded that there were basically three
types of unemployment compensation plans in existence, all
^^Tbid.
,
pp. 11-13.
44
the result of private arrangements. These included plans
established by employers, plans established as a result of
the cooperation of employers and unions, and plans established
solely by trade union organizations.^^ It was not until 1932
that Wisconsin enacted the first compulsory unemployment
compensation insurance law.
Unlike the public assistance programs, which used
financial need as the basic criterion for distributing assis-
tance, the social insurance programs were designed to provide
benefits as a matter of right to any person who participated
in the program and who had become unemployed. Whereas public
assistance programs relied upon a yearly appropriation of
funds by the state legislatures, the social insurance programs
were financed by the contribution of employers and/or employ-
ees to special trust funds from which employees could receive
benefits if they became unemployed.
Social Security Act of 1955: Public Assistance
During the early 1930s public officials gradually
began to realize that the state and local public assistance
programs and provisions for social insurance established by
private organizations were not adequate to deal with the
problems of economic insecurity caused by the depression.
The Social Security Act of 1955 was enacted in order to
^^John D. Hogan and Francis A. J. lanni, American
Social Legislation (New York: Harper, 1956), p. 493.
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improve and to supplement the existing public and private
programs. Public assistance and social insurance programs
constituted the principal categories of this new legislation
and thus may be viewed as an extension of the previous
programs
.
The major programs of public assistance established
by the Social Security Act included Old-Age Assistance (OAA)
,
Aid to the Blind (AB)
,
and Aid to Dependent Children (ADC)
.
Other minor aspects of the public assistance category con-
sisted of a number of public health and child welfare
17
services. The principal goal of these programs was
essentially the same as that of the previous state assis-
tance programs, namely the provision of cash payments to
indigent individuals on the basis of their financial needs
as determined by the public agency implementing the program.
In order to achieve this goal, the federal governirient
sought to stimulate state activity in a number of policy
areas (e.g., OAA, AB, ADC) by providing sufficient, financial
support to enable the states to create and implement sound
programs of public assistance. To this end, federal legis-
lation provided that certain minimum standards be observed
in the administration of the programs.
First, a state program had to include a provision
for the establishment of a state administrative agency
^"^Artliur J. Altmeyer, The Formative Yea rs of Sociaj_
Security (i'^ladison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), p. 15
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cither to implement the program itself or to oversee its
administration by county or municipal jurisdictions. Second,
a state program had to be in effect in all of the legal
jurisdictions within the state, i.e., within all of the
counties, cities or towns in the state. Third, a state
program had to provide for the financial participation of
the state in the public assistance program, whether the
program was actually implemented by the state agency itself
or by the county or municipal jurisdictions.
Other federal provisions imposed a number of pro-
cedural requirements on the state administrative agencies.
One such provision consisted of requiring a fair hearing and
appeal before a state agency for any individual whose applica-
tion for financial assistance had been denied.
The federal government placed very few stipulations
on the states' freedom to determine residence and citizenship
requirements. Federal regulations specified only that states
might impose a residence requirement restricting assistance
to those persons who had lived in a particular state for
five out of the previous nine years and one year continuously
preceding application for assistance.
Although these federal standards imposed standards
on the mode of implementation of these public assistance
programs, the states retained a great amount of flexibility
in designing the program to fit the particular requirements
of their individual communities. In the important area of
47
definition and determination of recipient need, the federal
statute specified only that awards had to be based on the
presence cf financial need. No attempt was made to specify
in fedeial legislation the actual conditions to be met in
determining financial need in a potential recipient.
The states also retained the right to determine the
amount of payments to public assistance applicants. The
federal government reimbursed the states for a portion of
the costs of the programs. For example, in the OAA and AB
assistance programs, the federal authorities agreed to pay,
in the 1935 provisions of the Social Security Act, fifty
percent of the amount of state assistance to applicants
per month, up to a maximum of $30. In regard to the ADC
program, the federal government would pay (again in the 1935
provisions) $6 of the first $18 spent by the states per
month on the first child of a family, and $4 of the first $12
spent on each additional child in the same family.
Although federal reimbursement was limited to a
specific percentage of the state assistance spent on each
recipient, federal aid was "open-ended" since there was no
overall limit to the amount of aid that a state might receive
Tiius
,
states that awarded small amounts of money to large
numbers of applicants could potentially receive large amounts
^^Rimlinger, p. 224.
^
^
Congress and the Nation (1945- 1 964) : A Review of
Governmen t and Politic s in the Postwar Year s (Washington, D.C
Congress i onal Quarterly Service, 1964), p. 12S0.
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of funds from the federal government. No matter how the
states might allocate benefits in fact, they possessed a
great amount of flexibility in their implementation of these
public assistance programs. Ultimately, however, each of
these programs was conceived to be only a temporary first
line of defense against economic insecurity.
Social Security Act of 1955: Social Insurance
The long-range goal of the federal policy makers was
to replace the public assistance programs with functioning
social insurance programs. The principal goal of the social
insurance program was to provide cash benefits to persons as
a matter of right, rather than financial need, and thus to
avoid the "means" test imposed upon applicants for public
assistance awards.
The more innovative of the two major social insurance
programs incorporated into the Social Security Act was Old
Age Insurance. Unlike the public assistance programs, which
were financed by appropriations from the general revenue,
the Old Age Insurance program relied upon the compulsory
contributions of employers and employees in a special payroll
tax. The statute provided that a payroll tax of one percent
(on the first $5,000 of the employee's earnings) be levied
on all employers and employees in most major businesses.
In the case of such an insurance program, a person who
worked in a "covered" employment, one in which employers and
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employees made regular contributions into the payroll t
for a specific length of time, could receive by right a
monthly cash pension upon reaching age 65. The exact amount
of the pension was subject to federal regulation and was
based upon the average earnings received by a specific worker
prior to his retirement.
The Old Age Insurance program was the only pr ogram
incorporated into the Social Security Act to be administered
solely by federal administrative personnel. This was done for
the sake of administrative efficiency, since officials assumed
that the tasks of keeping accurate records of all individual
workers, many of whom moved from one state to another during
their working careers, could be accomplished only by use of
one centralized agency.
The other segment of the social insurance category
in the Social Security Act consisted of provisions for an
unemployment compensation insurance program. In this program,
the federal policy makers sought to induce the states to create
their own individual unemployment insurance programs, rather
than to create a nationally administered program at the federal
level. This task was accomplished by requiring all employers
with four or more employees in their firms to pay s. 3.1 per-
cent federal payroll tax on the first $3,000 of the annual
wages of each employee. The statute provided, however that
if a state established an unemployment compensation program
(approved by federal law)
,
employers in that state would receive
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an offset of 2.7 percent from the 3.1 percent federal tax.
In this case, the employers would pay a state payroll tax,
receive credit against the federal tax, and pay the remaining
0.4 percent of the federal tax to the federal government.
This tax-offset mechanism, in lieu of the more familiar grant-
in-aid device to stimulate the states to set up or improve
a particular public program, proved to be rather effective,
and by the end of 1939, all of the states had initiated such
unemployment insurance programs.
The administrative structure of the unemployment
insurance program, was rather similar to that of the typical
public assistance policy. The state legislatures decided
upon the amount of benefits to be awarded to the various
unemployed workers, the length of time that benefits might be
paid, and the requirements for attaining insured status in a
covered employment.
The similarity between the public assistance and un-
employment insurance programs, however, must not lead one to
confuse the purposes of the two policies. The unemployment
compensation program was instituted as an insurance program,
to provide cash benefits to unemployed people who participated
in the program. The qualifications for receiving benefits,
although they varied in their particulars from state to state,
were structured around the concept of covered employment rather
than of need.
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Post-1955 Developments in Public
Assistance: General Trends
The adoption of the public assistance programs by
the states after 1935 proceeded quite rapidly. By September
1938, all of the 48 states, the District of Columbia, and the
territories of Alaska and Hawaii had adopted OAA programs
approved by the Social Security Board. In June 1941, 44
jurisdictions had established ADC programs, and 43 had
instituted AB assistance programs.
The vast majority of the amendments to the Social
Security Act focused on provisions dealing with financial aid
to the states. There has been a steady increase in the per-
centage of finnncial assistance given to the states by the
federal government. Although it is not necessary for the
purposes of this thesis to present a history of the changes
in the public assistance programs, it is appropriate to
mention one of the more recent important alterations in their
structure and implementation. In a 1972 Amendment, three of
the major grant-in-aid assistance programs. Aid to the Blind,
Old Age Assistance, and Aid to the Permanently and Totally
Disabled, were consolidated and transformed into one Supple-
mentary Security Income (SSI) program. The effect of the
amendment is to "nationalize" (or "federalize") these formerly
^James A. Maxwell, The Fiscal Impact of Federalism
in the United State s (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
P r e s s , 19 4 6), p . 155.
^^Congress and the Natio n, pp . 1280-1283.
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federal-state programs and to assure that federal benefits,
under uniform rules, will be paid to all eligible claimants.
These payments, financed by general revenues, and begun in
January 1974, may be supplemented by the states in any assis-
tance programs which they might choose to adopt. This new
program is particularly relei'^ant to the present study, because
the Disability Determination Units, which administer the Dis-
ability Insurance program in each of the states, have the
additional responsibility now of implementing the disability
aspect of the new SSI program, formerly administered by
state agencies under the APTD program.
Post- 1955 S . S . Developments: Attempts
to Institute a PI Program
One of the most important developments in the history
of Social Security legislation since 1935 was the establish-
ment of the Disability Insurance program in 1956. During the
period from 1935 to 1956, there had been a great deal of con-
troversy over the proper role of the federal government in
regard to the support of disabled persons and concerning the
form that support, if given, should assume.
Even in the middle of the 1930s, there existed several
federal or state programs for assisting the disabled. For
public and private employees, there were 'federal and state
workmen's compensation programs vv'hich assisted persons injured
while on the job by payirig medical costs and certain living
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expenses to the injured person and his family. For the
indigent blind person, whose blindness had been incurred in
either work-related or non-work- related activity, the Social
Security Act included a special public assistance program
(i.e.
,
Aid to the Blind)
,
which provided regular monthly
cash benefits for living expenses. Furthermore, the Railroad
Retirement Act of 1937 made provision for the payment of some
disability insurance benefits to disabled railway workers.
The major problem with these programs, however, was
that they provided assistance only to special categories of
individuals or for special types of disabilities. Workmen's
compensation programs, for example, covered only those
injuries sustained by a person while performing his job;
and the AB program assisted only those disabled by blindness.
Likewise, the Railroad Retirement Act covered only employees
in a specialized job category. Thus, coverage for persons
afflicted with permanent or temporary disabilities was not
provided in any all-inclusive program.
By 1937, the Social Security Board had already
concluded that additional legislation was needed in order to
cope v;ith the problem. A. J. Altmeyer, representing the Board,
pointed out that, although there existed protection against
unemployment because of occupational injury, there was no
"comprehensive protection against unemployment due to disability
22 Ibid.
,
p. 1287.
23 Ibid.
,
p. 1287.
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in a non- occupat ional capacity” in either state or federal
egislation. Whereas state workmen's compensation programs
provided assistance to those disabled on the job, they did
not cover persons incurring injuries off the job. The Social
Security Board proposed that action be taken to institute a
program to relieve the problem of temporary and permanent
disability, that it come under the jurisdiction of the Old-Age
Insurance program, and that payments be made both to the
disabled and the dependents of disabled persons.
However, responses from Congress were such that no
attempt was made to present the proposals for Congressional
consideration. There was firm opposition from the Republican
party leaders in Congress to the development of any new program
under the Social Security Act. As a result, when the Social
Security Board subm.itted its three-year study of the develop-
ment of the Social Security programs in 1939, it stated that
no "positive recommendations” were being made ”at this time”
2 6
on the necessity for a Disability Insurance program.
In 1939. however. Senator Robert F. Wagner introduced
a bill to establish a federal - state cooperative disability
grant-in-aid program, in which a maximum of freedom and re-
74 .
“ First Annual Report of the Social Security Board
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1937), p. 12.
^^Susan Campbell, A Changing Federalism: Federal - State
Relations in the Dis ability Ins urance P rogram, Unpublished Masters
Thesis
,
U. of Mass., 1967, p. 75.
^
^
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sponsibility would have been given to the states to implement
the policy. Had it been enacted into law, this proposal would
have encouraged the states to institute public assistance
programs for the disabled who were in financial need, as
determined by the state agencies themselves. Thus, it would
have operated as a typical federal grant-in-aid program.
Opposition to this bill was voiced by a number of
interest groups during public hearings. Representatives of
the American Medical Association (AMA)
,
in particular, argued
that such a program would eventually lead to a federally
administered, compulsory insurance program. The bill was
defeated in committee. No significant progress was made in
the institution of a Disability Insurance program during the
remaining years of the administration of President Roosevelt.
During the administrations of President Truman,
debate continued between the President and members of Congress
who opposed the extension of the Social Security insurance
program to cover disability. Opponents of a Disability
Insurance program voiced their opposition to the possible
harmful effects on the economy of increased public expenditures
and to the increase of federal influence in any expanded pro-
28gram
.
Pressure for action, however, continued to increase.
^^U.S. Congress, Senate. Subcommittee on Education
and Labor, Hearings, To Establish a National Health Progiam ,
76th Cong., 1st Sess., 1939, p. 79.
28 Campbell
,
p . 87
.
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Efforts at amending the Social Security Act were directed
toward the establishment of a social insurance type disability
program, to be administered in the same manner as the Old-Age
Insurance program (i.e., federal administration, payroll tax,
and provision of benefits as a matter of right to all those
persons qualifying under the program). Other proposals were
made for a public assistance type program to support disabled
persons not eligible for insurance benefits. This latter
program would have operated in similar fashion to the proposed
Robert Wagner program discussed above. Based on financial
need as determined by the states, it would have acted to
support those disabled persons unable to qualify under the
disability insurance provisions.
In 1949 the House of Representatives passed an
omnibus Social Security bill, containing both a disability
insurance program tied to the Old-Age and Survivors' Insurance
program and a new public assistance program for the disabled.
The House had previously rejected an alternative measure which
had proposed to drop the insurance provisions and to retain
only the public assistance features. Because of opposition
within the Senate, the disability insurance provisions were
finally dropped, but the public assistance features of the
bill were enacted into lav\r and constituted the program of Aid
to the Permanently and Totally Disabled (APTD) . In the APTD
2 9' Congress and the Nation
,
p . 1287.
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program, the Congress authorized the federal government to pay
a percentage of the costs of the operation of a state's dis-
ability assistance program if the latter agreed to operate
within the framework of minimum federal requirements. As
with any grant-in-aid program, the states assumed the principal
responsibility for instituting and maintaining the program
within their respective jurisdictions.
The next major attempt to amend the Social Security
Act in regard to disability policy occurred in 1952. One of
the proposals in the omnibus Social Security Amendments bill
that year consisted of a provision for a "disability freeze"
to be added to the Old-Age and Survivors' Insurance program.
This measure was designed to assist a worker w'ith a long-term
disability by preventing his period of disability from being
counted against him in regard to (1) the computation of the
number of quarters that he needed in covered employment to
be eligible for OASI at 65 years of age; and (2) the com-
putation of his average monthly wages on which the amount
of the old-age pension w^as based. Unlike a disability
insurance provision, the disability freeze did not provide
benefits to a disabled person, but only assured him that the
requirements for OASI (i.e., a minimum number of quarters in
covered employment) could be fulfilled during a period of
long-term disability. In opposing this new bill, representa-
•^°Ibid., p. 1288.
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lives of the AMA contended that, by giving to the Federal
Social Security Agency the right to supervise disability
determinations, the program would lead to eventual federal
regulation of medicine. The bill was ultimately defeated.
At the beginning of the Eisenhower administration
in 1953, there was an initial period of doubt about the
attitude of the new President toward Social Security programs
in general and toward the social insurance type of programs
(e.g.
. Old - Age - Survivor s ’ Insurance; Unemployment Insurance)
in particular. In 1954, however, he sent a Special Message to
Congress in which he explained his support for the concept of
social insurance as incorporated into the Social Security Act.
He based his conclusions upon what lie perceived to be the
congruence between the idea of social insurance and the tradi-
tional American interest in individual initiative. He argued
that the fundamental difference between the social insurance
program and other private insurance programs was that the
former enabled citizens to build the foundation for their
3individual security on a national scale. Thus, operating
as it did on the principle of requiring individuals to con-
tribute to their own security, it was a "reflection of the
3 "^'American heritage of sturdy self-reliance."
^'^^
Ibid
.
,
p. 1288
T O
Dw^ight D. Eisenhower, The Public Papers of the
President of the United State s (Washington: Li.S. Government
Printing Office
,
i960), Vol. 1954, p. 534.
^^Ibid.
,
p. 534.
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Later in 1954, President Eisenhower requested the
^r^sctment of a disability freeze." Unlike the previous
attempt to adopt a disability freeze, this one passed through
Congress with considerably less opposition. Undoubtedly,
the influence of President Eisenhower and his views on the
positive quality of a national social security program had
an effect in assuaging opposition from members of Congress,
especially those Republicans who had previously argued against
any extension of the social security programs.
At least as important as this change in attitude
among Congressional members, however, was the introduction
into the disability freeze bill of features far less objection-
able to potential critics than those in the 1952 bill. As
in the 1952 bill, the new proposal for a disability freeze
simply sought to provide assurance to long-term disabled
workers that the requirements for receiving Old-Age Insurance
could be fulfilled during their period of disability. There
was no provision for the payment of benefits to disabled
persons
.
However, whereas the previous bill had contained a
provision for allowing the Federal Social Security Agency the
right to supervise the disability freeze, the new bill pro-
posed that state vocational rehabilitation agencies administer
tliO new program. The House Ways and Means and Senate Finance
Committees explained the emphasis on state administration as
follows; (1) the states had 34 years of experience in the
60
field of vocational rehabilitation; (2) state officials
understood better the peculiarities of their "occupational
terrains" (i.e., the opportunities for employment in a
particular area), and (3) the states' proximity to the indi-
vidual enabled them to judge more accurately whether a
particular person was eligible for the disability freeze.
Thus, emphasis was placed not only on a decentralized system
of administration but also upon the importance of vocational
rehabilitation for the disabled. In this manner potential
opponents of the measure were able to reconcile the idea of
a disability freeze with their strong support for a free
enterprise type of economic system based upon individual
•
• ^
^
• 35initiative
.
The disability freeze incorporated into the 1954
Social Security Amendments became operative in July 1955.
For the purposes of the program, disability was defined as
the "inability to engage in substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment that can be expected to result in death or to be
3 6
of long- continued and indefinite duration." In 1955 alone,
57,221 applications for the disability freeze were approved.
^'^Campbel 1
,
p. 96.
^^ Ibid
.
,
p. 97.
^^Charles Schott land, "Social Security Amendments of
1956: A Summary and Legislative History," Social Security
Bulletin, 19 (September, 1956), p. 5.
61
Priority was given to workers over 65 years of age (or with-
in six months of 65 years)
. While 57 percent of the decisions
for allowance of the disability freeze were granted to persons
65 years or older, of the remaining 43 percent, one-half were
in the age group 60-64.^^ Thus, the disability freeze, at
least initially, was directed toward the elderly workers
rather than toward the young and middle-aged workers.
Institution of Disability Insurance Program
In 1955 members of Congress became concerned over the
high costs of the Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled
(APTD) public assistance program. Expenditures for APTD had
risen to $225 million in 1955 and one-half of this amount was
paid to disabled persons under fifty years of age. In order
to provide some remedy for these high costs, in 1955 a dis-
ability insurance measure w^as introduced into the Fiouse of
Representatives as part of the omnibus Social Security
amendments bill. The disability provision in the Fiouse bill
consisted of a recommendation to reduce the age of eligi-
bility for benefits under the social insurance provisions
for those disabled from sixty-five to fifty years of age.
The Senate Finance Committee conducted open hearings
on the bill in the early months of 1956. A number of interest
groups (e.g., the AMA, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce) voiced
opposition to the disability insurance features. Their
^"^Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical
Supplement, 1955, p. 2.
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concern centered upon the possibility that this program
would eventually lead to a national health insurance system.
After some bargaining in a conference committee over the
House and Senate versions of the new program, the bill
finally passed in 1956.
With the formal establishment of the Disability
Insurance program in July 1957, disability insurance benefits
were paid for the first time to persons between the ages of
50 and 65 years who were afflicted with total and permanent
disabilities. The new law was implemented in the same
manner as the disability freeze of 1954, that is, by state
agencies in each of the states. These agencies, or Dis-
ability Delerminiiig Units, are tlie principal administrative
structures implementing the program. Since these DDU ’ s make
the major decisions in determining whether or not a dis-
ability claimant will or will not receive benefits, any
inquiry into the importance of the states in the decision-
making process of the Disability Insurance program must focus
on these agencies and their role in determining the percentage
of disability allowances for claimants in the states. This
analysis will be included in the discussion of the political
system variables in Chapter VI.
The method of financing the new Disability Insurance
program was similar to that used in the OASI programs, i.e.,
that of a completely federal funded insurance strategy. (This
differed from the old grant-in-aid approach utilized in the
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APTD program.) Beginning in 1957. an additional tax (com-
bined employer-employee) of one-half of one percent on wages
of employees and of three- eighths of one percent on income
of self-employed was imposed to cover the costs of the new
3 8program
.
Qualifications for the receipt of disability benefits
included the following requirements: (1) the person had to
be both fully and currently insured under the Old-Age Insur-
ance program; (2) he had to have worked for twenty quarters
in covered employment during the forty-quarter period that
ended with the quarter in which the disability began: (3)
in addition, he had to have a disability that would either
result in deatli or be of long and indefinite duration; and
(4) the potential beneficiary had to wait six months before
the receipt of benefits, so as to rule out the possibility
3 9
of temporary disability.
The amount of the monthly benefits was to be the
same as the "prime insurance amount," computed as though
the worker had become entitled to OASI benefits in the first
month of his waiting period. In the OASI programs, a worker
who worked in covered employment for a specific length of
time rctceived a cash payment upon reaching 65 years of age,
based upon his average earnings at the time of his retire-
ment. In regard to the DI program, a worker's disab?.lity pay-
^^Schott land
,
p. 5.
^^ Ibid
.
,
p. 4.
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ment would be calculated on the basis of his earnings at the
time of incurring the disability. Unlike the OASI programs,
in the Disability Insurance program there was no earnings
test, whereby benefits would be suspended because a person’s
earnings exceeded a specified amount*, the definition of
disability precluded payment of disability insurance to any-
one engaged in substantial gainful activity.
As with the disability freeze legislation, vocational
rehabilitation played an important role in the Disability
Insurance program. Applicants for disability benefits were
to be referred to the state Vocational Rehabilitation Agency
for possible rehabilitation therapy, and monthly insurance
benefits could be suspended if a beneficiary refused to
accept rehabilitation services without good cause.
After the institution of the Disability Insurance
program, the disability freeze provisions still remained in
effect. They provided disabled persons under 50 years of
age an opportunity to have their period of disability counted
as part of their worktime requirements for their Old-Age
Insurance and possible Disability Insurance benefits, if the
disability was permanent and lasted until they reached age 50.
Besides a provision for adult workers between the
ages of 50 and 65 who became permanently disabled, the Social
4 2
40 Ibid
. ,
p . 4 .
41 Ibid
. ,
p . 4
^ I b i d
.
, p . 4
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Security Amendments of 1956 included, within the framework
of the Disability Insurance program, a provision for dependent
disabled children of a deceased or retired insured worker.
This measure provided that if such a child had become totally
disabled before reaching age 18, that child would be included
in the Disability Insurance program. The same considerations
regarding the permanency of the disability and the obligation
to accept rehabilitation services were applied here as to the
major adult insurance program.
Finally, the initial provisions of the Disability
Insurance program required that the amount of benefits paid
to a disabled person be reduced by the amount he or she
received from any other disability program. This would include
benefits from such programs as APTD or any federal or state
workmen’s compensation programs received because of a
44
claimant's physical or mental impairment.
Post-1956 Disability Insurance Amendments
There have been several important amendments to the
initial laws instituting the Disability Insurance program in
1956. The 1958 amendment extended disability insurance
dependents' benefits to all those persons dependent upon a
disabled person, including wives, dependent retired husbands.
^^ Ibid
.
,
p. 5.
'^^Arthur Hess, "Old Age, Survivors, and Disability
Insurance’ Early Problems and Operations of the Disability
Provisions," Social Secu rity Bulletin , 20 (December, 1957)
,
p . 12.
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a.nd children disabled prior to 18 years of age. The ainendnient
also eliminated the tax offset provision which required the
amount of benefits received from other federal or state
disability compensation programs to be deducted from the
amount paid under the Disability Insurance program.
In the Social Security Amendments of 1960, there
were two important provisions regarding the Disability
Insurance program. The first consisted of a measure to
abolish the minimum age of 50 years for receipt of disability
insurance benefits. Henceforth, disabled workers of any age
cou3d receive benefits provided that they met the requirement
of having worked twenty quarters in a covered employment and
were permanently and totally disabled according to the program's
definition of disability. The second major provision of the
amendment granted that a disability beneficiary would be
allowed a period of 12 months of trial work during which
time the benefits or freeze to w'hich he was entitled would
be continued. Benefits to a beneficiary who recovered during
this period would be continued for two months after the
month in which he recovered
.
The 1965 Social Security Amendment eliminated the
requirement that a worker's disability be expected to be of
^^^Susan Campbell, p. 100; Congre'ss and the Nation ,
p. 1288.
^^Congress and the Nation, p. 1288; William Mitchell,
"Social Security Legislation in the 86th Congress," Social
Security Bulletin. 23 (November, 19601, p. 3.
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"long-continued and indefinite duration.” The new law pro-
vided that this particular eligibility requirement could be
fulfilled of the disability could be expected to result in
death, or had continued or could be expected to continue for
a continuous period of not less than twelve calendar months.
Also in 1965 disability benefits were extended to those
persons becoming blind before the age of 31 if they had
worked in covered employment for six quarters or for one-half
of the time between the age of 21 and the onset of their dis-
ability. Prior to this amendment, persons were required to
have worked five of the previous ten years before the onset
4 8
of their blindness.
The 1967 Social Security Amendment extended to all
persons disabled before the age of 31 a less stringent
insured status requirement. Persons from age 24 to 31 were
now required to have 50 percent of the quarters in which they
v\'orked from age 21 in covered employment. Persons w'ith an
onset of disability before age 24 needed one-half of the
qua 49rters from age 21 to 24 in covered employment. Disability
1 *7
Wilbur Cohen and Robert Ball, "Social Security
Amendments of 1965, Summary and Legislative History,” Social
Security Bulle tin. 23 (September, 1965), p. 14.
^^on g r e s_s and the Nation ( 1965-1968): A Review of
Government and Po l itics (Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Quarterly Service, 1969), p. 759.
^^Wilbur J. Cohen and Robert M. Ball, "Social
Security Amendments of 1967: Summary and Legislative History,”
Social Security Bulletin, 31 (February, 1968) p. 11.
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benefits were extended to blind persons age 55 or older who
were not able to work in their previous employment. No
substantial gainful activity standard was to be used in the
case of this category of claimants.
Also in 1967 disabled widows and disabled dependent
widowers became eligible to reduced benefits at age 50; the
actual amount of benefits was relative to the age of entitle”
ment
,
i.e.
,
at age 50
,
50 percent of the spouse's primary
insurance amount; at age 60, 71.5 percent of the amount;
and at age 62, 82.5 percent of the primary insurance amount.
Disability for this category o f claimants had to occur either
before the death of the spouse or within seven years after
his/her death
.
The 1967 amendment furthermore attempted a clarifica-
tion of the definition of disability. It noted that dis-
ability required that a claimant not be able to engage in
substantial gainful activity in any job which exists within
the "national economy," which the amendment defined as "work
which exists in significant numbers in the region in which
he (the claimant) lives or in several regions of the country,
but Without regard to whether a specific job vacancy exists
foy; him, or whether he would be hired if he had applied for
-
^
work."'^‘" Further discussion of the actual effect of this new
^^Congress and the Nat i on (1965-1968) , p. 759.
^^Cohen and Ball, "Social Security Amendments of 1967,"
pp . 10- 11
.
^^Ibid.
,
p. 11.
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definition of disability will be presented in Chapter VI, in
the analysis of administrative decision-making process.
Conclusions
This chapter has provided an historical perspective
on the development of Social Security legislation, particularly
on the institution of the Disability Insurance program. As
stressed in the introduction to this thesis, the study of the
DI program is to be seen from the perspective of a theory of
American federalism. Thus the historical development traced
in this chapter must be seen within this context. In the
second chapter it was concluded that the American political
system is best viewed from the perspective of cooperative
federalism. The present chapter illustrates the accuracy of
this view of federalism. Even during the Depression and
New Deal period, when pressure would have seemingly been
greatest for the institution of completely federal welfare
programs, the vast majority of the new programs granted the
states ample freedom to devise their own policies, albeit
within the framework of federal standards. With the crea-
tion of the Disability Insurance program in 1956, once again
the notion of cooperative federalism manifested itself in
legislation which provided for national standards to be
created by the federal government but also for the opportunity
of state agencies to administer the program within their own
jurisdictions. Although the case of cooperation in regard to
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the disability program is not so clear as in the typical
grant-in-aid programs, nevertheless one can at least hypo-
thesize that there will be points at which negotiated
coordination between the federal and state personnel will be
necessary for the effective implementation of the program.
A detailed analysis of these matters must wait until Chapter
VI, where the results of interviews conducted in several
states will be analyzed.
Besides the contention that the cooperative theory
of American federalism is accurate, it has been argued that
political culture plays a major role in the maintenance of
an effective system of cooperative federalism. The movement
in counterpoint to the individualist and popular sovereignty
orientations to American government has helped to preserve
a system of cooperative relations between the states and to
keep the balance from tipping too far in the direction of
either the states or the federal government. Again the
historical material dealt with in this chapter illustrates
the tension that exists between proponents of limited govern-
ment and those who favor increased governmental (usually
federal) involvement in social welfare and health programs.
The significant strengths of both viewpoints also points to
an explanation of the continuing cooperative relations of
the states and federal government in the formulation and
implementation of public policy. With specific reference to
the Disability Insurance program, this tension once again
I
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manifested itself in the manner of implementation of the
program; that is, the federal government has been allowed to
formulate general policy but the states are called upon to
administer that policy. Thus, the fact that the American
political system is a federal system and the fact that the
American system operates within a particular cultural milieu
has important consequences for the manner in which public
policy decisions are resolved.
CHAPTER I V
IMPACT OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC VARIABLES ON
THE DISABILITY PROGRAM
Introduction
The preceding chapters dealing with federalism and
with the history of the development of the Disability Insur-
ance program have supported the position that, even with the
growing importance of the federal government, the states do
retain a vital role in our federal system and furthermore that
the struggle over the initiation of disability insurance
reflects this fact through the establishment of the state
Disability Determining Units as the basic decision-making
agencies in determining who will receive disability benefits.
The analysis will now turn to the impact of selected socio-
economic variables on the functioning of the Disability
Insurance program in the states, i.e., in terms of the
variability in the disability insurance allowance rates
among the states. This analysis will be followed in the
next two chapters with discussions of the impact of the in-
put and political system variables upon the dependent variable.
Levels of Decision-Making in the
Disability Program
The common dependent variable to Avhich the socio-
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economic, input, and political system variables are to be
correlated is the variability in the allowance rates for
disability insurance benefits among the states. In order
to attain a better understanding of the meaning of allowances
(and denials) within the context of the Disability Insurance
program, it is useful here to discuss the levels of adminis-
trative decision-making at which all owances and denials are
made. This will provide a context for further elaboration of
the exact meaning of the dependent variable. Analysis of the
actual decision-making process within the Disability Determin-
ing units in the states will be presented in Chapter VI .
^
Disability benefit claims are initiated at the federal
level in any one of the 800 Social Security District Offices.
The function of the District Office is to interview the
claimant and to obtain from him the necessary OASDHI earnings
data to determine whether there is technical eligibility for
disability insurance. Until 1971 the District Office had
the further responsibility of obtaining from the claimant
and his physician the former's medical records, indicating
the nature and extent of the supposed disability. Since then,
the state Disability Determining Units (DDU's) have taken
over this task of acquiring medical data. This change allows
the state agencies to become involved in the claimant's case
^The following analysis has relied heavily upon the
work of Robert G. Dixon, Jr., in S ocial Security and Mass
Justice- -A Problem in Welfare Adjudication (Praeger Publishers,
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at the very outset of the determination process. At the
District Office, approximately fifteen to twenty percent of
the claims are denied for technical reasons, such as lack of
the sufficient number of quarters in covered employment.^
If a claimant is not denied for a technical reason,
then a state examiner in the DDU makes a decision on whether
or not the claimant is in fact disabled, utilizing federal
rules and regulations as guidelines. The standards used in
making decisions and the amount of flexibility involved from
examiner to examiner or from agency to agency will be dis-
cussed in Chapter VI.
Until 1972 all of these initial determinations made
by the state DDU ' s were reviewed by the Bureau of Disability
Insurance (BDI), the federal agency in charge of the adminis-
tration of the DI program. Since that time, BDI policy has
3 . •been to review only five percent of the cases. Explaining
this action, BDI has argued that the five-percent sampling
method allows an adequate check on the operations of the state
agencies and also for more intensive analysis of the decisions
made in the sample survey."^ Although this may be the case,
switching from 100 percent review to five percent review also
means that EDI can only question the decisions on a small
Ibid
. ,
p . 26 Ibid. , p.' 28.
^U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means,
Disability Insurance Program, Staff Report (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 28.
1
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percentage of the cases decided by the state agencies, thus
giving the DDU ' s more control over the decisions they make.
Moreover, under both the old and new procedure,
BD I must consult with the state DDU ' s when it considers a
denial decision by the latter to be in error, although this
is not necessary when BDI concludes that an allowance decision
should be reversed. In both cases BDI has the explicit right
to review decisions made by the DDU ' s , but the requirement for
consultation in some cases indicates again that the states
do not have simply a passive role in the administration of
the program.
\Vhen a claimant is denied an insurance claim, he has
a period of six months in which to request a reconsideration
of his case. This reconsideration process is virtually iden-
tical to the initial determination outlined above. The re-
consideration level of the decision-making process is not
prescribed by statute but is authorized by Social Security
Administration (SSA) regulations in order to provide a
second attempt to correct "erroneous” denials before the
hearing examiner level of decision making.^ During the re-
consideration stage, all of the state DDU’s decisions are
reviewed by BDI. As in the initial consideration stage, BDI
must consult w^ith the state administrators if it considers
a denial decision by the latter to be in error. Reversals
c;
“Dixon, p. 32.
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of previous denial decisions at the initial level is about
30 percent during the reconsideration process.^
If upon reconsideration the claimant is once again
denied benefits, then the case goes to the Hearing Examiner
or Administrative Law Judge, attached to SSA's Bureau of
Hearing and Appeals (BHA).^ At this level the claimant has
the right to appear personally, and as in the other two
levels of decision-making, has the right to be represented
by counsel. New information concerning the claim may be pre-
sented. Unlike the reviews at BDI
,
the hearing examiner may
O
reverse a state agency denial. The rate of reversals of
9previous denials by the DDU ' s and BDI is about 53 percent.
If the claimant is denied benefits by the hearing
examiner, he may seek a hearing by the Appeals Council,
although the Council may deny the claimant's request for
review. The Council may review, affirm, modify, or reverse
the decision of the hearing examiner.
Unless the claimant commences a civil action in a
District Court, the denial decision of the Appeals Council
is final. In case the Council does not agree to hear the
case, then the decision of the Hearing Examiner is final.
Any decision, however, made anywhere in the disability deter-
f- 1 . .
Staff Report, p. 32. Dixon, p.'34.
I bid
.
, p . 36 .
^^Ibid.
,
p. 31.
^Staff Report, p. 32.
^^Dixon, p. 46.
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mination process may be reopened for "good cause" (for
example, new evidence which would have a bearing on the
case) within four years after the final decision. In the
case of purported fraud, a case may be reopened at any time.
Disability Awards Variability as
Dependent Variable
It is within this framework of levels of decision-
making that examiners in the DDU ' s determine whether or not
an applicant will receive disability benefits. Although the
DDU ’ s are involved in both the initial and reconsideration
stages of the process, the disability dependent variable
discussed in this study will be confined to the initial
determination level. The dependent variable consists of the
ratio between awards and denials of disability insurance
benefits among the states in 1970. Since the population used
for the measurement of awards and that used for the measure-
ment of denials is not identical, a ratio of awards to denials
has been presented as the most accurate form of the dependent
variable. Although the time frames for the measurement of
each aspect of the dependent variable, i.e., the percentage
of awards and percentage of denials, are not identical, they
closely approximate each other and both fall within the 1970
time frame. For these reasons, it is not technically
correct to speak of the percentage of awards or percentage
of denials when discussing the dependent variable. However,
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because the ratio is symptomatic of a measurement of award
and denial percentages, it may be translated into a percent-
age and will be referred to in thi*: way in the analysis.
The data on the variability of disability benefit percentages
is derived from an analysis of all the states together and
this precludes any discussion of award percentages for any
particular state.
In discussing the variability of disability award
percentages among the states, it is worth remembering that
this is supposedly a federal program in which the state
agencies only implement the federal statutes and adminis-
trative rules and regulations. The goal of "uniformity” in
administrative implementation is one of the major tasks con-
fronting the Bureau of Disability Insurance. Review pro-
cedures outlined above, frequent use of memoranda, further
specification of rules and regulations, and other attempts
to inculcate the purpose and governing regulations of the
disability insurance program into the perspective of the dis-
ability examiners is a principal function for the federal
agency. This type of continuous supervision should point to
a situation in which percentages of awards and denials among
the states vary only in a minimal way.
Tlie analysis of the variability in the ratio of
aivards to denials of disability insurance benefits among the
states indicates that this assumption is not true. Statis-
tics on awards and denials by state Disability Determining
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Units in 1970, issued by BDI and used in this study as a
ratio of awards to denials of benefits among the states,
shows that the ratios vary from 41 percent to 71 percent
among the states, with the mean at 52 percent. (See Appendix
to Chapter IV, pp . 97-98.) Thus some states approached a
ratio of 41 percent awards to 59 percent denials, while others
were closer to a ratio of 71 percent awards to 29 percent
denials. These figures indicate quite a large span of
variability among the states in providing claimants with
disability benefits to which they presumably feel they are
entitled. This conclusion is not incongruent with the basic
hypothesis of the thesis, however, that the states in fact
are able to exert tlioir influence even when administering a
completely federally funded program.
Identification of Independent
Socio-Economic Variables
Having shown that the dependent disability variable
does in fact vary to a significant degree among the states,
it is now appropriate to begin an analysis of some of the
proposed factors which should explain this variation. As
suggested in Hypothesis Three on page 3 of Chapter I, it is
expected that socio-economic cliaracter is t ics , which constitute
a part of the environment of the political system, have an
impact on the variability of disability benefit award per
centages among the states. Thirteen socio-economic variables
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have been selected for use in this study. The rationale for
the selection of each of the variables will be discussed in
the next section of this chapter. Table 1 provides a
listing of these socio-economic variables. As with the
dependent disability variable, the percentages of the socio-
economic characteristics refer to the states combined. Cor-
relations between these independent variables and the depen-
dent variable apply to the states as an aggregate and not to
any individual state.
Table 1
Listing of Socio-Economic Variables
1. Median Age 8.
—
1
% labor force working in
Central Business District
2. % 18-65 in labor force
% labor force
9. % persons using public
3. transportation to go to work
unemployed
Median years of educa-
10. % population living in the
4 . same house as 5 years ago
tion of population
11
.
Mean social security income
5. % population with per family
vocational education
12. % people leaving labor force
6. Median family income from 1960 to 1970
7. % foreign born I—
>
% of population non-white
In order to simplify the analysis and to give greater
focus to the independent variables, soci-o - economi c character-
istics of similar type have been grouped into categories.
This procedure allows the number of variables to be reduced
from thirteen individual variables to eight categories of
similar type variables. These categories are listed in Table 2,
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Table 2
Categories of Variables
Category Variable(s) in Category
1
.
Age Status 1
.
Median age (1)
2. Employment Status 2. 1 18-65 in labor force (2)
% labor force unemployed (3)
% leaving labor force (12)
3. Income Status 3. Median family income (6)
Mean social security income
per family (11)
4. Migration Status 4. ^ living in same house (10)
5. Race 5. % of population non-
white (13)
6. Ethnicity 6. % population foreign
born (7)
7. Spatial Status 7. ^ of persons taking public
transportation to work (9)
8. Education 8
. % population with vocational
training (5)
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Hypotheses on Relationships Between SES
Variables and Disability RateJ
In previous studies considering the relationships
between socio-economic characteristics and welfare type
policies in the states, researchers have usually found a
strong correlation between measures of socio-economic develop-
ment and the level of welfare services. This has been a con-
sistent conclusion of a number of articles and books published
on the subject during the last decade or more. It is impor-
tant to keep in mind, however, that these studies have focused
on those programs which award benefits to people on the basis
of economic "need," rather with those based upon the insur-
ance principle, in which benefits are awarded to persons who
participate in the program and qualify under its regulations.
Research reported by Richard Dawson and James Robin-
son as early as 1963 provided a corrective to the then
predominant view that the type of party system in a state
was the primary factor in determining the level of welfare
policies in a state. “ Dawson and Robinson concluded that
the socio-economic condition of the states was a greater
determinant of the level of welfare policy than such political
factors as inter-party competition and voting turnout. The
specific socio-economic characteristics that they found to be
^^Richard E. Dawson and James A Robinson, "Inter-
Party Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies
in the American States," Journal of Politics , 25 (May, 1963)
265-289.
I
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the most fruitful predictors were measures of the wealth of
a state, and the levels of urban and industrial development.
This conclusion was supported in a comprehensive study by
Thomas Dye, in which he showed that socio-economic environ-
ments (including educational level of the state population,
as well as the variables used in the Dawson and Robinson
study) of state political systems accounted for a higher
percentage of the variance among the states in their welfare
policies than did any other determinants.^^ Since the
publication of Dye's study in 1965, his conclusions have
been tempered somewhat by further research of other scholars,
but they do tend to substantiate his conclusions about the
influence of socio-economic characteristics on the decision-
makers within the political system.
In regard to this study, involving a program whicli
docs not grant benefits on the basis of economic need but
utilizes the criterion of incapacitating disability, one
can expect that the relationships between socio-economic
characteristics aTid the rates of disability benefit awards
among the states will not simply duplicate the types of
relationsliips discovered in the analysis of welfare programs.
Theiefore, tlio categories of independent variables must be
'^Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics, and tlie
Pub lic (Ch.icago: Rand McNally, 19 6
6
^"^Ira Sharkansky and Richard Hofferbert, "Dimen-
sions of State Politics, Economics, and Public Policy,"
American Political Science Review, 63 (September, 1969)
8l)7-~8''rr.
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discussed in terms of their likely relationship to the
percentage of disability benefit awards, within the context
of the design of the Disability Insurance program. The
program design must in effect dictate the hypothesis offered
in the case of the relationship of a particular socio-
economic characteristic with the dependent variable. In this
way it will be possible to determine; (1) whether or not
socio-economic characteristics as a whole have an impact on
the variance of awards of disability insurance among the states;
and (2) whether it is only those socio-economic variables
which, according to the program design, are permitted to
account for variance in the award rates which do in fact
explain the variance in the levels of the dependent variable
in the various states.
Within the design of the Disability Insurance program,
it is expected that ratios of awards to denials of disability
benefits will vary among the states according to the social
and economic profiles of the particular states. In fact,
socio-economic characteristics are supposed to explain all
of the variation in the levels of awards and denials of
disability benefits among the states. However, not all
socio-economic variables are seen as legitimate determinants
of benefit variance. Therefore, by means of the selection of
socio-economic characteristics which should account for
variance and those which should indicate no correlation w'ith
the dependent variable, one should be able to determine
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whether or not the program is being administered according
to the goals of a federal Disability Insurance policy or
whether in fact the state decision-makers are being influ-
enced by criteria which are not applicable to this type
of program or at least to its explicit design.
However, determining which of the specified socio-
economic characteristics are "legitimate’’ predictors of dis-
ability benefits and which are in violation of the program's
intent is enormously difficult. This is the case because
the original conception of the program, i.e., that an
applicant should receive benefits only when it had been
medically determined that the disability prevented substantial
gainful activity, was altered by the process ultimately
utilized to determine who should receive such benefits. For
example, as will be noted in more detail in Chapter VI, it
is possible for an applicant to receive benefits even if the
disability is "equivalent to" those for which benefits are
specifically authorized, and if the claimant's education and
work history is such that employment is unlikely. The point
is that modifications in themselves suggest that benefits
could be given to "need" oriented clients even though the
disability might not warrant such a decision.
Given this development in the program.' s operation,
three categories of socio - econom.ic characteristics will be
established: tlie first for characteristics v;hich are clearly
related to the insurance orientation of the program; the
86
second, where benefits are given based on characteristics
which are not clearly related to the severity of the dis-
ability but upon other mitigating circumstances which at
least raise questions about their relationship to the
insurance orientation of the program; and last, a category
of socio-economic characteristics which apparently influence
the awarding of benefits even though they are factors which
relate to need rather than the severity of the disability.
The age of the applicant is the only variable which
fits into the first category. This is because the initial
assumption, in line with the design of the Disability Insur-
ance program, is that, as a state’s population increases in
age, there will be a higher percentage of disability awards
to the percentage of denials. The disability program was
originally designed to provide benefits to disabled persons
between the ages of 50 and 65 years, thus assuming that the
older members of the population are more susceptible to
disabilities than are the younger. Previous studies focusing
on more restricted sample surveys have found that disability
recipients tend to fall within the higher age brackets, thus
giving added weight to the hypothesis presented here.^^
The second category of variables consists of educa-
tion, race, and ethnicity. In regard to education, it is
^^Phoebe H. Goff, "Disabled-Worker Beneficiaries
under OASDHI : Regional and State Patterns," Social Security
Bull etin
,
36 (September, 1973), see Table 3, p. 93j and
Henry Brehm, "The Disabled on Public Assistance," in Social
Security Bulletin, 33, pp.' 26-30; see Table 3, p. 93.
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assumed that the more educated a state’s population, the
lower will be the disability benefit award percentage. This
is because it is permitted, as already noted, for the DDU
examiners to take into consideration the educational level
of claimants in those cases in which a claimant's disability
is not so severe that he would be granted benefits immediately.
A claimant s level of educational background, therefore, may
partially determine whether or not he will receive disability
benefits. Furthermore, studies conducted prior to this one
have shown that disability beneficiaries tend to be persons
with lower educational backgrounds.^^ However, these findings
do not negate the point that the consideration of educational
levels rather than disability severity at least raises the
possibility that benefits can be given under such circumstances
for applicants who are poorly educated and therefore are
unable to find employment given their disability rather than
on the basis of tlie precise nature of the disability.
The last two variables in this second category are
race and ethnicity. Previous studies have shown that non-white
and other minorities account for a higher percentage of the
total number of beneficiaries than their percentage of the
^^Brehm, see Table 4, p. 93; and Kathryn H. Allan
and Milfred E. Cinsky, "General Characteristics of the Dis-
abled Population," Social Security Bulletin, 35 (August, 1972),
pp. 24-37.
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population would normally indicate. It could be argued
that these characteristics are indeed related to the issue
of the nature of a disability since it is most likely the
case that these people have a greater tendency to be
employed in more physically demanding jobs and therefore
have a greater propensity for incurring disabilities. How-
ever, it could also be suggested that the issue of an appli-
cant's race or ethnicity results in benefits being awarded on
the assumption that, because of the applicant's race or
ethnicity, job opportunities will be less likely given the
claimed disability. If this is the case, then the issue of
need is at least partially present.
Distinct from the first two classifications of
variables are the following socio-economic characteristics
which, according to the disability program design, should
shovv' no relationship with the dependent variable. These
variables -- spat ial status, employment status, income status,
and migration status- -are used in order to determine the
extent to which federal rules, regulations, and other program
controls are effective in guiding the actions of the decision-
makers in the DDU ' s
.
The special status category includes two distinct
components: the percent of persons with their place of work
within the central business district and a measurement of
^'Phoebe Goff, see Table 3, p. 93; Goff, "Disabled
Beneficiary Population, 1957-1966," Social Security Bulletin ,
34 (July, 1971), pp . 32- 4 2; see Table 3, p. 93; and Brehm, see
Table 3 p. 93.
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the availability of public transportation in a person's
residential area (i.e., for the purposes of transportation
to his place of employment)
. It is assumed that in areas
where there is a higher percentage of people who work within
the central business district, there will be a lower per-
centage of award recipients; and that in areas with more
adequate public transportation facilities there will be a
negative impact upon the percentage of disability awards.
Both aspects of the spatial status category therefore should
explain some of the variance in the dependent variable, because
they will affect the possibilities of a claimant engaging in
substantial gainful activity in his area of residence. Yet,
as Chaptei VI will suggest, a Congressional amendment to the
Social Security Act in 1967 explicitly stated that benefits
were not to be given merely because an individual was unable
to find employment in the area of his residence. Given this
restriction, awarding of benefits on the assumption that a
claimant will not be able to find a job in his area of resi-
dence runs counter to the expressed design of the disability
insurance program.
The employment status category is utilized in order
to determine whether or not there is an association between
a state’s employment situation and the percentage of dis-
ability benefit a\;ards to claimants. Since the program under
study is an insurance program and not a welfare program
based simply upon economic need, there should be no correla-
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tion between eiriployinent status and the percentage of dis-
benefit awards among the states. The employment
situacion in a particular area is not one of the criteria
which DDU examiners are supposed to take into consideration
in making judgments about the eligibility of claimants for
disability benefits.
The income status category can be viewed as another
indicator of whether or not the disability program is being
administered in the states as an insurance program or as a
welfare program based upon economic need. In a welfare type
program, it might be plausible to suggest that states with
lower levels of median family income probably have a higher
percentage of welfare recipients than do states with higher
levels of median income. In regard to the Disability Insur-
ance program, however, such reasoning is inappropriate,
since tlie program is entirely federal - funded and adminis-
trators are not supposed to take into account in making
determinations the income level of the claimants. Any
correlation between income status and the percentage of
claimants receiving disability awards will, therefore,
suggest that administrators are not conforming to the
explicit design of the disability program.
Migration status, consisting of the percentage of
people 18-64 years of age who have participated in inter-
state, intra-state, or inter-county migration from 1965 to
1970, is the final variable within the classification of
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variable which should not relate to the dependent variable.
Migration may be considered a function of unemployment, rather
than of unemployability because of disability. It is assumed
that there will be a greater tendency for people who move
about to be unfamiliar with the job situation in their par-
ticular area of residence and therefore to use a disability
impairment as an opportunity to benefit from some type of
unemployment compensation.
Impact of Socio-Economic Variables on
the Disability Award Rates
Having presented the hypotheses concerning each of
the categories of variables, it is now possible to proceed
to the analysis of the effect of the socio-economic character-
istics on the percentage of benefit awards to claimants
among the states. The analysis here has utilized the
statistical technique of multiple regression. This procedure
allows one to measure the combined effect of a number of
1
8
independent variables on a dependent variable. The
closeness of association between the independent and
dependent variables can be indicated by the mult iple- correla-
tion coefficient (R) • It is, however, more useful to report
the square of the mult iple- correlation coefficient (R ) which
is referred to as the coefficient of multiple determination.
It indicates the percentage of the variance in the dependent
^^Dennis Palumbo, Statistics in Political and
Behavioral Science (New York: Apploton-Ccntury-Ci of ts , 1969),
p . 210.
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Gxpla.in.Gd by thG combinGd GffGct of thG indGpGndGnt
var iablGS . ^ ^
When thG socio-Gconomic charactGr ist ics arG corrGlatGd
with thG dGpGndGnt variablG, thG rGsults indicatG that thG
thirtGGn indGPGndGnt variablGs Gxplain 64 pGrcGnt of tho
variancG in tho dopondont variablo. Although this is a sub-
stantial pGTCGntagG of thG variancG in thG IgvgI of disability
award ratGS among tho statGS, it is loss than ono might
GxpGCt sincG thG program was intont ionally dosignod to pro-
cludG any dotorminants of variation Gxcopt socio- Gconomic
factors. ConsGquGnt ly , it would appoar that othor unknown
factors have entered into the picture. The possibility that
input characteristics and aspects of the political system
itself have an impact on the administration of the program
will be explored in Chapters V and VI of this thesis.
When the significant variables were divided into the
three categories according to their theoretical relationships
with dependent variable, the following results were obtained.
Median age was the only variable eligible for the first
category, which consisted of any variable which, according
to the design of the Disability Insurance program, was per-
mitted to influence the awarding of disability benefits. The
coT'relation in this case did not prove to be statistically
significant, and so no conclusion about the impact of the age
variable can be presented.
^^Ibid.
,
p. 214.
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In the second category of variables, those which
manifested an ambiguous relationship to the dependent
variable, all three of the variables proved to be signifi-
cant, They are listed in Table 3, together with the amount
of variance in the dependent variable which each one
explains. The ethnicity variable is the most important
predictor, explaining ten percent of the variance in the
award percentages among the states. The second variable
listed in the table is education, which adds five percent
to the total variance explained. Race is the third variable,
which adds an additional three percent to the variance
explained and brings the total to 18 percent. These findings
at least suggest tliat there are ambiguities in the adminis-
tration of the Disability Insurance program in the states,
since these socio-economic variables have been hypothesized
to be at least potentially of a type which should not mani-
fest any correlation with the dependent variable.
Table 3
Significant Variables in Category Two
Variable R^
Ethnicity 10%
Education 5%
Race 3%
Total 18%
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More conclusive findings are available from the
analysis of the third category of socio-economic character-
istics and their impact upon the variance in the disability
benefit award rates in the states. All four of the variables
in this category proved to be statistically significant and
they are listed in Table 4. As the table indicates, migra-
tion status is by far the most important predictor, alone
explaining 28 percent of the variance in the benefit award
percentages among the states. Also of prime importance is
the employment status variable which accounts for an addi-
tional 12 percent of the variance in the dependent variable.
Finally, income status and spatial status contribute three
percent to the total explained variance of 46 percent for
the variables in this third category. Even more than with the
variables in the second category, the results of these
correlations must be judged within the context of the dis-
ability program design, which indicates the effect that any
particular variable should have upon the benefit award
levels among the states. From this perspective, one comes to
the rather surprising conclusion that nearly two-thirds of the
variance explained by the socio-economic variables (46 out of
64 percent) is accounted for by the socio-economic character-
istics in this third category which should, theoretically,
show no correlations with the levels of awards and denials of
disability benefits. As was indicated in the hypotheses for
each of these variables, the expressed purpose of the Disability
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Insurance program, in regard to its administrative implementa-
tion, was to eliminate the possibility that factors such as
migration status and employment status would influence the
decisions of state DDU administrators in making allowance
and denial determinations. These findings bolster the con-
clusions of the analysis in regard to the second category of
variables and, furthermore, compound the inadequacy of any
conclusion that socio-economic characteristics alone can
explain the variance among the states in the levels of
awards and denials of disability insurance benefits.
Table 4
Significant Variables in Category Three
Variable
Migration Status 281
Employment Status 12%
Income Status 3%
Spatial Status 3%
Total 46%
The conclusions to be drawn from the
must be tentative. Because of the design of
program and the complex of federal statutes,
regulations instituted to insure that the st
the program along strict federal guidelines,
of variance in the award/denial rates among
above analysis
the disability
rules, and
ates administer
the percentage
the states
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explained by the socio-economic variables is too low. Further-
more, many of the variables which, according to the design of
the prograjti, should not have had an impact upon the variance
in the dependent variable, in fact did manifest sometimes
strong correlations with levels of disability awards among
the states. Obviously, the number of socio-economic character-
istics used in this study was limited, and therefore no rigid
conclusions should be inferred from the analysis. However,
the possible independence of the state DDU administrators
from the strict federal guidelines set down for the adminis-
tration of the program, as evidenced by the findings presented
in this chapter, points to the appropriateness of considering
the impact of input and political system characteristics
upon the disability insurance benefit award levels among the
states. This will be the task of the following two chapters.
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Appendix to Chapter IV
Further explanation of the nature and method of
acquis ition of the data constituting the dependent variable
is appropriate. Data on the awards and denial rates of
disability benefits of the state Disability Determining
Units (DDU’s) was provided by the Bureau of Disability Insur-
ance (BDI) of the Social Security Administration. This data
was transformed into ratios of awards to denials of disability
benefits for each of the states, and the variance among the
states in these ratios from 41 percent to 71 percent is dis-
cussed in the text. The variations of ratios among the
states can be seen more clearly by listing the various per-
centages together with the number of states which mani-
fested a particular ratio of awards to denials of disability
benefits
:
centage No. of States Percentage No. of States
41 % 1 54?ci 3
4 4 % 1 561 1
47 % 3 51 % 8
48 % 1 58 % 3
4 9 % 4 60% 2
50 % 11 61% 1
51 % 2 62% 2
52 % 5 66% 1
55 % 2 71% 1
In order to confirm the accuracy of the 'data constituting the
dependent variable for this study, one might refer to Staff
Report of the House Committee on Ways and Means on the Dis-
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2 0ability Insurance program. In this report, data is pre-
sented on the denial rates of the state DDU ’ s for the years
from 1966 to 1973. (Tables 41 and 42, pp . 223-224) For
1970, the average rate of denials was 44.7 percent, with the
range extending from 28 percent to 60 percent. (Table 43,
pp . 225- 226 •) This complements the average award rate of 52
percent presented here, thus indicating that the statistics
in both studies tend to confirm one another. Incident ially
,
the ranges of percentages of denial rates for 1967 to 1973
listed in the House study show wide variations in these rates
over a period of several years, thus indicating that the data
for 1970 is by no means representative of an aberration in
the behavior of the DDU administrators.
20 Staff Report.
CHAPTER V
INPUT VARIABLES AND VARIABILITY
IN DISABILITY AWARDS
Introduction
The results of the analysis of the relationship of
selected socio-economic characteristics and the variance
in the level of disability insurance benefit awards among
the states indicated that these environmental variables were
not able to account for the total variance in the dependent
variable. Although as a whole they explain 64 percent of
the variance in the award/denial ratios, a significant per-
centage of the variance is left unexplained. Furthermore,
individual socio-economic characteristics which contributed
to this percentage of explained variance did not manifest
relationships with the dependent variable that could be
considered appropriate given the design of the program and
the supposedly passive role of the state DDU examiners within
it
.
In order to ascertain other sources of explanation
for the variance in the disability awards, the analysis shall
follow the theoretical outline of the systems model discussed
in Chapter I and focus next upon the "input” characteristics
as potential explanatory variables. As explained in the
99
100
earlier discussion of the systems model, inputs represent
the demands and supports being transmitted from the environ-
ments of the political system into the system itself. The
level and intensity of inputs vary from state to state and
among the multifarious contending groups within each of the
states. Moreover, the resources available to decision-makers
within the political systems are normally scarce, and this
necessitates responding in an unequal manner to the demands
placed upon the decision-makers. This dynamic tension of
demands and responses, with the results depending in large
measure upon the structure of the input characteristics and
the resources of the political decision-makers, justifies
the assumption that input characteristics will have some im-
pact upon the variance in the disability insurance benefit
,
awards among the states. Only a "neutral relationship," one
in which speculation on the positive or negative direction of
II
I
the relationship is not appropriate, can be expected in this
i case, however. In a program such as Disability Insurance,
I
in which active state political involvement is considerably
less than in the variety of welfare programs, input character-
1
istics cannot be reasonably hypothesized to be so closely
I
I
associated with the levels of disability benefit awards as
I to enable one to propose that the form.er will determine the
specific directional movement of the latter.
I
I
I
I
I
Hypoth eses on Relationships Between Input
Variables and Disability Program
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With these theoretical points in mind, the discussion
will turn to an elaboration of the specific input variables
selected for use in this study. The first of the variables
to be considered is inter-party competition in the states.
This variable measures the extent to which there are two
equally matched political parties in a state, each of which
has an opportunity of being elected as a majority to the
available offices in the legislative and executive branches.^
The theoretical assumption underlying the formation and use
of this variable by political scientists within the system's
framework is that the responsiveness of a state political
system will be conditioned in part by the likelihood that
political officials in one party will be replaced by those
in another if the former representatives are not responsive
to the demands of the public which they represent.
The importance of this assumption in stimulating
scholars to explore the relationships between degrees of
inter-party competition and types of public policy produced
by the political system can hardly be exaggerated. For the
purposes of this study, however, it is sufficient to review
the discussion of researchers on the association between inter-
party competition and the v/elfare policy formulated in a
^Austin Ranney, "Parties in State Politics," in
Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines, eds . , Politics in the Americ an
States, 2nd. ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1971), 82-1-1
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state political system. There has been considerable debate
among scholars over the extent of the direct effect of inter-
party competition on public policy in general and welfare
policy in particular. The earlier studies of these relation-
ships were conducted by such students of American political
parties as V.O. Key, and many of his former students, including
Duane Lockard and John Fenton. In a major study of Southern
it ics
,
Key found that those states which had bifactional
one-party systems were more likely than states with multi-
factional party systems to pursue more "liberal” welfare-type
policies. Later, Lockard, in his study of New England State
3Politics
,
found that those states with two-party systems
(e.g., Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island) insti-
tuted more liberal welfare policies than did states with one-
party systems, such as Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont.
These scholars concluded from their studies that inter-party
competition was a primary cause of the higher level of public
policy outputs in the states.
In 1966 Thomas Dye produced the most comprehensive
challenge to the older interpretation of the role of inter-
party competition in state politics. Dye, in a study of the
relationships between socio-economic characteristics, political
^V. 0. Key, Jr., Soutliern Politics in State and
Nation (New York: Knopf, 1951), see especially pp . 298-314.
^Duane Lockard, New England State Politics (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1959).
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input and system variables, and policy outputs, concluded
that input variables such as inter-party competition did
not have an independent effect upon policy. He argued that
socio-economic characteristics were the piimary determinants
and that the effects of political inputs were negligible.^
Although Dye has repeated his conclusions in a later study,
^
other scholars have found that his conclusions needed to be
modified. Two major efforts in this regard were published
by John Fenton, in People and Parties in Politics ,^ and by
Ira Sharkansky and Richard Hofferbert.^ Both of these studies
concluded that inter-party competition indeed did have a
substantial effect upon the level of public policy in general
and welfare policy in particular.
In regard to the expected relationship between inter-
party competition and the variance in the levels of dis-
ability insurance benefits among the states, the hypothesis
(see Hypothesis Four on page 3, Chapter I) is that there
will be a correlation between the two variables which will
indicate that inter-party competition is able to account for
Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics, an d the Public
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966)
.
^Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy (Engle-
wood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prent ice -Hall
,
1972), Chapter 11.
^John H. Fenton, People and Parties in Politics
(Glenview, 111.: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1966)
.
7
Ira Sharkansky and Richard Hofferbert, "Dimensions
of State Politics, Economics, and Public Policy," American
Politic al Science Review
,
63 (September, 1969), 867-879,
esp . 877.
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some of the variance in the award levels. That there should
be any relationship at all runs contrary to the policy design
for the disability program, but the specific associations
discovered in the previous chapter lead one to expect that
other variables besides socio-economic ones could have an
impact upon the variance in the levels of disability benefit
awards
.
The second input variable selected for this study is
voter turnout. This variable represents the percentage of
eligible voters who participate in state-wide elections. For
the purposes of this study, state-wide elections will refer
only to elections for the governors of the states. It is
logical to assume that states with higher levels of voter
turnout have a greater percentage of citizens with interest
in political activity and a willingness to express their
wants and needs. Higher levels of political input activity
place greater demands upon the political system decision-
makers to respond favorably to the desires of those partici-
pating. As in the case of inter-party competition, there
has been a debate among political scientists over importance
of voter turnout as a direct determinant of particular levels
of policies among tlie states. The major proponents of each
side of the discussion are the same. Thomas Dye, in two
major studies, concluded that the importance of voter turn-
out as an independent variable is minimal when compared to
g
the overwhelming effect of socio-economic characteristics.
^See esp. Dye, Understanding Public Policy , pp . 254-257.
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However, Sharkansky and Hofferbert found in their study that
high voter participation was one of the most important
factors in determining the level of welfare
spending in the states.^ Furthermore, Fry and Winter, in a
study of the determinants of redistribution policies in the
states, concluded that political participation was strongly
associated with policies which address themselves to the
wants and needs of the lower income classes.
With the results of these studies in mind, one might
hypothesize (see Hypothesis Five on page 4, Chapter I) that
there will be an explanatory relationship between the levels
of voting turnout in the states and the variance of disability
benefit awards among the states. Any significant correlation
between these two variables will provide more evidence of the
impact of the states in the administration of this federal
program and support the findings in the previous chapter that
state DDU decision-makers do not simply follow the regulations
of the program in a passive manner.
The strength of interest groups in the states con-
stitutes the third input variable for this analysis. In
modern, urban- industrial societies, interest groups have been
one of the principal means for the articulation of demands by
those people who feel that the political system should respond
^Sharkansky and Hofferbert, p. 877.
^*^Brian Fry and Richard Winters, "The Politics of
Redistribution," American Political Science Review , 64 (June,
1970), 508-522.
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to their needs. The number, strength, and amount of activity
by interest groups differs from state to state. Harmon
Zeigler and Hendrik van Dalen concluded from their study of
interest group systems in the states that the strength of
these groups seemed to be inversely correlated to the degree
of inter-party competition in the states and also to the
socio-economic status of the states. Thus, states with
stronger interest groups tend to have one-party systems and
lower levels of urbanization, industrialization, and per
capita income. This conclusion serves to indicate that
states whose system of party competition is not adequate for
the articulation of needs of the various groups within the
states have developed more complex and active interest group
systems to compensate for the lack of competition among the
parties
.
In regard to the present study, it is hypothesized
(see Hypothesis Six on page 4, Chapter I) that variance in
the strength of interest groups in the states will act, in
analogous fashion to the two other input variables discussed
above, as an explanatory factor in accounting for the variance
in the disability benefit awards dependent variable.
^^Harmon Zeigler and Hendrik van Dalen, "Interest
Groups in the States," in Jacob and Vines, pp . 122-160, esp.
p. 127; and Lewis Froman, "Some Effects 'of Interest Group
Strength in State Politics," American Political Science
Review, 60 (December, 1966), 952-962.
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Impact of Input Variables on
Disability Program
The analysis of the relationships between the input
characteristics and the dependent disability insurance benefit
awards variable follows the same statistical procedures
specified in Chapter IV. They include the use of the mul-
tiple regression technique to produce the coefficient of
2
multiple determination (R ) which indicates the percentage
of the variance in the dependent variable explained by either
a single independent variable or a set of them.
The results of the statistical analysis indicates
that two of the three input variables do show a moderate
explanatory association with the dependent variable, but
also that no more than tentative conclusions can be drawn
from these correlations.
Table 5 indicates that there is a low to moderate
association between two of the input variables and the vari-
ance in the percentage of disability awards among the states.
Voting turnout proved to be the most useful variable in
explaining the variance in levels of disability insurance
awards granted to claimants by the DDU’s in the states. The
interest groups variable indicates a relatively weak associa-
tion with the dependent variable and thus allows for only
tenuous inferences about its predictive value. The inter
party competition variable showed no statistically significant
correlation with the dependent variable.
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Table 5
Input Variables and DI Benefit
Awards Association
Variable r2
Inter -party
Competition —
Voting turnout 10^0
Interest groups
Total 14 %
It is not really surprising that voting turnout
should prove to be the most suggestive variable. It is less
remote than the other input characteristics in indicating a
potential direct influence upon the variance in the percent-
ages of benefit awards among the states. Voting turnout
represents a more direct measure of the participation of
citizens and their predisposition to express their wants
and needs through the input channels into the political
system.
Although the three input variables together explain
only 14 percent of the irariance in the disability benefit
awards variable, the results still appear to be rather
significant. In the first place, it should be noted that
the Disability Insurance program is not a welfare program.
In the latter, state decision makers actually have a primary
role in formulating policy and establishing the rules and
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regulations for the program. In the disability program,
federal governmental officials are responsible for making
the rules and overseeing the administration of the program
by the state DDU s. Therefore, in this type of situation,
there can be no hypothesis of direct cause and effect relation
ships between any of the input variables and the variance in
levels of disability insurance benefit awards. One can expect
only that these independent variables will have an indirect
association with the dependent variable, and that they will
provide "climates" which may be conducive to vrarying levels
of disability benefit awards to claimants.
It seems fair to conclude that the percentages of the
variance explained by two of the three input variables tends
to indicate that the hypotheses presented in this chapter
are correct. The input characteristics help to account for
a significant percentage of the variance in the disability
variable which was not explained by the socio-economic
characteristics. Furthermore, the results give greater
credence to the hypothesis that the states do have a sub-
stantial role to play in the determination of the m.ode of
administration of this federal program. The follov\ring
chapter, which will include a discussion of the impact of
political system characteristics upon the variance in the
percentages of disability benefit awards among the states,
w^ill afford a greater opportunity to ascertain the role of
the states in a completely federal program and thus to pro-
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vide a better understanding of the reality of federalism
in practice in the United States.
CHAPTER VI
THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND DISABILITY
AWARD VARIABILITY
General System Characteristics
and Award Variability
In the preceding four chapters, the analysis has
centered upon either the environmental conditions or input
factors which were considered likely to have an effect on
the operation of the Disability Insurance program in the
states. In this chapter the focus shifts to a considera-
tion of liio role of the state political systems in general
and the DDU ' s within the state administrative structure in
particular in explaining the variance in the percentage of
benefit awards to claimants. As noted in Chapter III, the
DDU’s perform the function of implementing the Disability
Insurance program on the state level and making the actual
decisions about who will receive awards of disability
benefits
.
In the discussion of the systems model in Chapter I,
the analysis pointed out that the key decisions concerning
the "allocation of values" for a society are made by actors
within the political system. Their actions are conditioned
by the environirients within which they operate and by the
inputs emerging from the environments into the political
ill
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system. Responses to the multitude of demands made upon the
political system decision-makers are made within the context
of the limited resources available. The principal task of
this chapter will be to examine the effects of actions by
decision-makers within the DDU ' s , in regard to their impact
as explanatory variables, on the variance in the levels of
awards and denials of disability insurance benefits to
claimants. This analysis w^ill be prefaced, however, by a
discussion of specific characteristics of three general politi-
cal system institutions- -the legislature, executive, and
administ rat ive - -which might have a predictive relationship
to the variance in the dependent variable. As with the input
variables discussed in the previous chapter, only a "neutral
relationship" can be hypothesized to exist between the
political system variables and the variance in the percentage
of disability benefit awards in the states. Again, the nature
of the Disability Insurance program precludes any reasonable
assumption that general political system characteristics can
determine a specific level of percentage of disability bene-
fit awards, since the states do not play an active role in
the program as they do in the multifarious welfare programs.
However, in tlie discussion of the impact of the state DDU
administrators on the dependent variable, reasons for specific
levels in the award percentages among the states will be
suggested. In this case, the relationship between the DDU '
s
and the disability insurance benefit award variability is
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direct, and speculation about cause and effect associations
in terms of specific directions of movement between the two
sets of variables is pertinent.
The discussion in Chapter II and III showed that the
states participate in a system of cooperative federalism
which insures them a fundamental role in the formulation and
implementation of public policy. Analysis of the research
of scholars such as Morton Grodzins and Daniel Elazar
indicated that at the center of the relationships of the
state and federal political systems is the notion of "negotia-
ted coordination" or the principle of bargaining in order to
arrive at a particular policy acceptable to both federal and
state political system actors. The history of the develop-
ment of the social security programs in general and the Dis-
ability Insurance program in particular has illustrated this
relationship by showing the ability of the states to acquire
basic decision-making roles in the implementation of the
particular programs, especially Disability Insurance. The
analysis of the explanatory impact of the socio - economic and
input variables on the variance in the percentages of dis-
ability awards among the states has given even greater
credence to the conclusions of Elazar and others that the
states in fact continue to exert a major influence on both
the formulation and implementation of federal and state
polici es
.
Therefore, it is appropriate now to consider what
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characteristics of the state political system institutions
might be most useful as explanatory variables of the vari-
ance in the disability insurance benefit awards among the
states. It is suggested here that the relevant quality,
possessed to some degree by the legislatures, executives,
and administrative institutions of all of the state political
systems, is professionalism. Thus three political system
variables may be labelled variously as legislative pro-
fessionalism, gubernatorial professionalism (effectiveness)
,
and administrative professionalism. It may be argued further
that a fourth variable, political innovation, is germane
here, and it shall be used as a further indication of the
professional quality of state political systems.
Legislative professionalism was developed as a vari-
able in the analysis of comparative state legislatures by
John G. Grumm. He explicated this category by the use of
the following attributes: members and committees well -staffed
;
informational services available when needed; legislators
well-paid, work full-time, and regard their roles as pro-
fessional.^ Neither with this variable nor with any of the
other three professional political system variables discussed
below is tliere any suggestion of a direct cause and effect
^John G. Grumm, "The Effects of 'Legislative Structure
on Legislative Performance," in Richard Hofferbert and Ira^
Sharkansky, State and Urban Politics: Readings in Comparative
Public PolicyT^sTbn : Little, Brown, and Co., 1971)”, ^pp.
2’98-3’22, esp”^ p. 509; and The Citizens Conference on State
Legislatures, State Legislatures: An Evaluation of Their
Effectiveness iNew York: Praeg'er Publishers, 1971).
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relationship between the independent variables and the
variance in the percentage of awards of disability benefits
among the states. It is hypothesized only that there will
be an association between each of the independent variables
and the dependent variable strong enough to indicate that
the former serve an explanatory function in regard to the
variance in the dependent disability award benefit variable.
Therefore, in the case of the legislative professionalism
variable, it is hypothesized (see Hypothesis Seven-a on page
4, Chapter I) that professionalism in the legislative insti-
tutions of the state political systems will account for some
of the variance in the disability awards among the states.
Gubernatorial effectiveness, the second political
system variable selected for this study, was formulated by
Joseph Schlesinger in order to determine the relative posi-
tion of the governors in their administrative -pol it ical
relationships with the other major institutions of the state
political systems. Schlesinger measured various aspects of
the formal powers of the governor, such as tenure potential,
2
appointive powers, budget powers, and veto powers. These
various aspects of the governor’s power indicate the degree
of effectiveness that he possesses in his relationships with
the administrative and legislative institutions with which
^Joseph Schlesinger, "The Politics of the Executive,"
in Jacob and Vines, pp . 210-237; and Thad Beyle and J. Oliver
Williams, 1 h e American Governo r in BehaviOi'al Perspective
(New York: liarper and Row, 1972).
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he must deal. In regard to this study, it is hypothesized
(see Hypothesis Seven-b on page 4, Chapter I) that guberna-
torial effectiveness will be correlated with variance in
disability benefit award levels among the states and will thus
act as an indirect determinant of variability in award rates.
Administrative professionalism, the third political
system variable, has been operationalized by Ira Sharkansky.
He has designed a measurement for administrative profession-
alism within state administrative organizations. Sharkansky
argues that the quality of professionalism is attributable
to administrators who have had "advanced training in their
fields of specialization," who have "an active concern to
stay abreast of the latest developments," and who have a
"desire to implement the most advanced level of service avail-
3
able." Since, as Sharkansky argues, no really adequate
measurements for administrative professionalism exist pre-
sently, salaries of top personnel in the administrative organi-
zation and average salaries and fringe benefits for all state
employees were used as indicators of professionalism among
4
state administrators.
Applying the notion of administrative professionalism
to the present study, one may hypothesize (see Hypothesis
Seven-c on page S, Chapter I) that the professional quality
of state administrative structures will have an explanatory
^Ira Sharkansky, "State Administrators in the Political
Process," in Jacob and Vines, p. 261.
"^Ibid.
. p . 262 .
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impact on the variance in the percentages of disability
benefit awards among the states. One might even suggest
that there should be a greater closeness of association
between the two variables than could be expected from the
legislative professionalism and gubernatorial effectiveness
variables. The Disability Determination Units (DDU's) are
of course a part of the state administrative organization
and therefore are presumably more sensitive to attributes
of the administrative part of the state political system.
The fourth and last of the general political system
variables is political innovation. This particular variable
was developed by Jack Walker, who sought to measure the
"relative speed with whicli states adopt new programs."^
Hence, Walker has focused upon the length of time that it
takes states to adopt programs which have been established
either at the federal level or by one of the state govern-
ments. Although not identical with any of the professionalism
indices discussed above, it is fair to assume that there is
a close affinity between states with high scores on these
measures of professionalism and those states which are more
innovative in adopting new programs. Therefore, one may
hypothesize (see Hypothesis Seven-d, on page 5, Chapter I)
that political innovation will act in analogous fashion to
the other professionalism indices as an explanatory factor
^Jack L, Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovation among
the American States," American Political Science Review ,
63 (September, 1969), p. 881
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of the variance of disability benefit awards among the states.
With these hypotheses in mind, it is possible now
to proceed to a summary of the results of the statistical
analysis. Table 6 indicates that the political system
variables relating to the general professional stature of
the state governmental institutions were quite fruitful in
accounting for variance in the levels of disability benefit
awards among the states. As shown in the Table below, ad-
ministrative professionalism proved to be the most signifi-
cant variable, explaining 16 percent of the variance in the
benefit awards variable. This variable was followed by the
gubernatorial effectiveness and political innovation indices,
which accounted for 7 percent and 6 percent respectively of
the variance in the dependent variable.
Table 6
Political System Variables and
DI Benefit Aivards Association
Variable
Administrative
Professionalism 16 %
Gubernatorial
Effectiveness 1 %
Innovation 6 %
Legislative
Professionalism —
Total 29 %
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The legislative professionalism measure did not
report a statistically significant correlation. It is
interesting to note that the two institutions closest to
the operation of the DDU ’ s represented by the administrative
professionalism and guvernator ial effectiveness variables,
accounted for the bulk of the variance explained by these
political system characteristics. Furthermore, a moderately
strong coefficient of determination (R ) of 29 percent clearly
points to the existence of other factors than socio-economic
characteristics in explaining the variance of disability
insurance benefit awards among the states. Although the
input variables discussed in Chapter V hinted at this con-
clusion, the political system characteristics discussed in
this section of the present chapter have added substantial
evidence in support of this view.
The results of the statistical analysis presented
here do allow one to conclude tentatively that certain
state political system characteristics do indeed account for
some of the variance in the levels of disability award
rates. However, more conclusive evidence for the correct-
ness of the hypothesis can only be obtained by examining the
decision-making process \\rithin the Disability Determining
Units themselves. Since it is v/ithin these state agencies
that the actual decisions about whether or not to allow a
claimant disability benefits are made, one would expect that
the m.cst useful explanatory determinants of the variance in
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benefit award percentages among the states would be found
there. Ascertaining the validity of this hypothesis will be
the task of the next section of this chapter.
The DDU * s and PI Benefit Awards
among the States
Having examined the impact of selected socio-economic,
input, and political system variables upon the variability
in the benefit award rates among the states, it is now appro-
priate to consider the role of the Disability Determining
Units themselves in accounting for the variance among the
states in the implementation of the program. Since the
administrators in the DDU ’ s are the key decision-makers in
the initial and reconsideration stages of the disability
determination process, it is likely that their attitudes
and actions will have a major effect upon the variance in
the levels of awards and denials among the states. Although
the quas i - independent action of the administrators implied
by this hypothesis runs contrary to the established goals of
the Disability Insurance program, evidence from the previous
analysis of the explanatory impact of environmental, input,
and general political system characteristics points to the
actions of DDU examiners and directors as further explana-
tions for the variability in the disability program among
the states.
The information, upon which the following analysis
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is based, was obtained through a series of interviews at
six state DDU offices and three federal regional disability
insurance offices. State DDU directors, supervisors, and
whenever possible examiners themselves, were interviewed in
the state agencies. In each of the Regional offices, the
representative of the Social Security Administration in charge
of the Disability Insurance program in a particular region
of the country was interviewed. Interviews took place at
the DDU’s in Massachusetts, Vermont, Connecticut, Wisconsin,
Oakland (a sub-state regional office of the California state
DDU), and Louisiana. The regional representatives were
interviewed in Boston, Chicago, San Francisco and Baton
Rouge. ^ Although these interviews actually constitute a
series of case studies from which any generalizations must
be tentative, care has been taken in selecting states not
only in various regions of the country, but also with signi-
ficant variations in the ratios of awards to denials of
disability benefits.
In order to determine the extent to which the atti-
tude and actions of disability examiners, supervisors, or
DDU directors have an impact upon the variance in the levels
of av/ards and denials in the disability program, it is neces-
^The Dallas Regional Representative was present
during the interviews with the DDU administrators in Baton
Rouge. The interviews with the DDU officials and the regional
representatives v;ere conducted by Professor Irving Howards of
the Dcpartnient of Political Science of the University of
Massachusetts. This writer w'as present at all of the inter-
views within the New England area.
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sary to examine in some detail the actual disability determin-
ation process as it occurs in each of the DDU ' s . Through
this examination it is hoped that factors pointing to sub-
jectivity in decision-making by state DDU administrators
will be revealed. This process of disability evaluation is
referred to here as the "sequential analysis" and consists
of a series of stages of decision-making in which disability
claimants are judged as to their eligibility for benefits.
The sequential analysis moves from cases of clear-cut
disability toward those in which more judgment on the part
of examiners is needed. As Robert Dixon explains, "the
tests are successive in the sense that they set forth a
progression from ’hardcore' disability to ’borderline'
disability, and a determiner cannot reach a conclusion to
7deny a claim until he has considered all the tests."
The first stage of the sequential analysis consists
of an objective medical determination of the purported dis-
ability of the claimant. Examiners rely upon the physician’s
diagnosis of the physical or mental impairment of the claim-
g
ant. Thereupon, tliey consult the Handbook for Physicians
in order to determine whether a claimant’s disability "fits"
^Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Social Security and Mass
Justice- -A Problem in Welfar e Adjudication (New York;
Praegef TubI isHers
, 1975X1 P- 54.
S. Department of Health, Education, and Wel-_
fare. Social Security Administration, Disability Evaluation
under Social Security; A Handbook for Physicians (Washing
-
Fon, D. C.; Co'vernme’nt Printing Office, 1970).
123
any of the categories of disability listed in the schedule
of imnairments
. If a claimant's disability is listed in
this schedule, then disability benefits are awarded without
inquiring further into the residual work capacity of the
applicant or his potential ability to overcome his disability.
Persons interviewed in the DDU's agreed that this
stage of the sequential analysis is a straightforward deter-
mination of w'hether a claimant meets the listings in terms
of a specific disability or impairment. The element of
judgment on the part of the examiners is negligible in these
cases, which constitute approximately ten percent of the
total number of disability insurance claims processed through
the DDU agencies.
The second stage in the sequential analysis centers
on a determination of whether or not a claimant's disability,
failing to meet the listings in the Handbook
,
will neverthe-
less conform to the "spirit" of those disability categories.
This involves a judgment as to whether a multiple number
of disability impairments of a claimant equal a category
stipulated in the listings. Although not an area where
great evaluation is called for, the examiners nevertheless
have to decide what an "equivalent" set of disabilities is
and whether or not to consult a physician in any particular
case to obtain expert medical advice. Several DDU adminis-
trators interviewed claimed that only minimal judgments are
made in this category of cases by the examiners. Some sug-
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gested, however, that the meaning of "equivalent” does in
fact introduce the possibility of varying interpretations.
These people also mentioned the problem of determining the
"residual functional capacity" of the claimant to engage
in "substantial gainful activity," in those cases in which
the particular disability does not automatically place one
under a medical listing where benefits are granted immedi-
ately.
Although these two concepts will be discussed in
greater detail in the examination of the third stage of the
sequential analysis, essentially the problem concerns the
determination of the ability of the claimants to perform
jobs that would allow them to earn a basic living wage.
Examiners must determine whether or not a claimant has a
disability which, although it does not meet the medical
listings prescribed in the Handbook
,
precludes him from
participating in employment sufficient to provide him with
a minimum wage.
One regional representative admitted that "consider-
able judgment" is required in determining whether the edu-
cational level of a claimant is adequate for him to engage
in substantial gainful activity, even in those cases falling
w'ithin this second stage of the sequential analysis. Further-
more, an interviewee i^i one of the DDU’s stated that this
stage of the decision-making process is "largely judgmental,"
mainly because the meaning of the term "equivalent" is judg-
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mental. This same response was elicited from members of at
least one other DDU
,
who suggested that the "equal to"
phrasing led to "considerable judgment" on the part of dis-
ability insurance examiners. Finally, persons interviewed
in some DDU s remarked that the problem of determining whether
or not a claimant can perform substantial gainful activity
has become a focus of attention even in this stage of the
decision-making process.
That these concerns should be mentioned in dis-
cussion this stage of the sequential analysis with respon-
dents in the DDU's is somewhat surprising since many other
administrators argued that this aspect of the decision-
making process is free of any major judgments on the part
of the examiners. This controversy of opinion in most of the
DDU's where administrators were interviewed suggests that
administrative regulations themselves cannot preclude
administrators from making judgmental decisions where cri-
teria such as "residual functional capacity" and "substan-
tial gainful activity," \\rhich cannot be rigidly defined,
are involved.
The role of the medical consultants in this stage
of the sequential analysis sheds further light upon the
difficult duties of the examiners in this area of decision-
making. In at least one of the DDU's, one of the super-
visors pointed to the problem of the attitude of the medical
consultants to allov;ances of benefits. This respondent
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argued that doctors defined disability in terms of their own
private practice and w'ere not sufficiently concerned with
specific regulations of the disability program. Furthermore,
a medical consultant in one DDU argued that, among doctors,
there are "allowance specialists" and "denial specialists,"
thus indicating the reality of interpretation and judgment
among the physicians themselves in regard to the disabling
effects of particular impairments. Although the examiners
themselves make the final decisions within the DDU ’ s
,
varieties of interpretations from the medical consultants
can only add to the amount of judgment already present at
this particular stage in the decision-making analysis.
The evidence of subjective judgment in this strictly
medical phase of disability determination process encourages
one to proceed to the third stage of the sequential analysis.
Claimants who are not able to meet the listings directly or
through equivalent impairments, but who nevertheless have a
"moderately severe" disability fall within this category,
which consists of 60 to 70 percent of the cases. Although
the principal criterion for evaluating the eligibility of
the applicant's claim remains the severity of the disability,
the examiner cannot rely upon the listings in the Handbook
or a judgment that multiple impairments are equivalent to a
particular category in the listings. Rather, the concepts
of "residual functional capacity" and "substantial functional
activity" mentioned above play major roles as criteria for
evaluation
.
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Unfortunately, the central notion of "substantial
gainful activity has a history of definitional ambiguity
and this is reflected in the diverse interpretations of this
concept by the DDU state administrators. A short digression
to outline the principal areas of controversy will therefore
be appropriate. The ability to engage in substantial gain-
ful activity was originally intended to assist disability
examiners in determining whether or not claimants' impair-
ments were severe enough to be considered eligible for
disability insurance. Although the Handbook for Physicians
was also available to assist examiners, the percentage of the
cases falling within the first two stages of the sequential
analysis was continually under 30 percent of the total
number. Substantial gainful activity (SGA) required not
only that a claimant's medical impairment prevent him from
working in his previous job, but also that it prevent him
from performing satisfactorily in other types of employment.
Thus, persons who were able to acquire other skills or
persons who were unemployed simply because of the socio-
economic conditions in their residential areas and not
because of a physical or mental impairment were precluded
from receiving disability benefits.
In the early 1960s, however, the courts reviewing
appeals of claimants who were denied disability benefits
became dissatisfied with the precision of the definition of
SGA. In 1960, Judge Friendly declared in the case of Kerner
V. Flemming that disability determination "requires resolu-
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tion of two issues-
-(1) what can applicant do, and (2) what
employment opportunities are there for a man who can do only
what applicant can do. Mere theoretical ability to engage
in substantial gainful activity is not enough if no reason-
able opportunity for this is available."^ Thereafter, greater
emphasis was placed on the types of jobs in the economy
which the claimant could perform in the reports of dis-
ability determining examiners. This did not include, however,
reference to specific jobs in the economy that were available
at the particular time for the claimant.
As a corrolary to this problem, the issue of the
geographical area in which employment opportunities had to
be available arose. In 1961, for example, in the case of
Butler V. Flemming
,
the court ruled that employment should
be available within the "general area where the claimant
lives. The issue was supposedly resolved in the 1967
Congressional amendments to the Social Security Act, in
which it is stated that a claimant can be considered dis-
abled
Only if his physical or mental impairment or impair-
ments are of such severity that he is not only unable
to do his previous work but cannot, considering his
age, education, and work experience, engage in any
9 Kerner V. Flemming, 283 P. 2d 916 (2d 1Cir. , 1960) ,
quoted in Staff Report of Committee on Ways and Means of
the U. c; House of Representatives on "'The Disability Insur-
ance Pr•og ram" (Washington: U. S. Government Pr i:nt ing Of f ice
,
1974)
, PP . 46-4 7 .
10 Butler V. Flemming, 288 F. 2d 591 (5 th Cir . , 1961)
quoted in SfaTT Report, p. 49.
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kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy, regardless of whether such work
exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or
whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, ’or
whether he would be hired if he applied to work.H
Although this is a fairly tight definition of SGA, the quali-
fiers of age, education, and previous work experience do
leave room for interpretation by the state disability
examiners. Furthermore, it allows the state administrators
to use their judgment in determining whether or not a claim-
ant has sufficient "residual functional capacity" to perform
in certain types of employment. As was pointed out in the
discussion of the second stage of the sequential analysis,
these particular criteria necessarily require the examiner
to make judgments about awards or denials even in those cases
where medical criteria are presumably the principal
determinants
.
It is in the third stage of the decision-making
process, however, that evidence is most readily available to
illustrate the impact that disability examiners may have
upon the variability in the percentages of disability insur-
ance awards among the states. Administrators interviewed
generally admitted that residual skills of the claimant,
his age, and educational background constitute the principal
criteria in determining whether or not a person applying for
disability benefits can engage in substantial gainful
activity
.
^^Staff Report, p. 49.
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In the process of determining the residual functional
capacity of a claimant, the state DDU agencies vary consider-
ably in their use of vocational rehabilitation facilities
which might provide valuable consultations in particular
cases. In one state, for example, the DDU has a full-time
vocational expert who is able to assist the disability
adjudicator. Moreover, difficult decisions in regard to
determining residual functional capacity are sent to a
Vocational Evaluation Center (a private, non-governmental
agency) where a claimant can be evaluated on the basis of
tasks that he is able to perform. In one other state, on the
other hand, the DDU administrators make their own decisions
solely on the basis of their own judgment of the merits of
the cases. Speaking of the state DDU ' s within his juris-
diction, one regional representative stated that there are
real problems with the notions of "significant impairment"
and "residual functional capacity," and that some state DDU
agencies allow under almost any circumstances, regardless of
the abilities of the claimants.
Although residual functional capacity does have an
important role in the determination of a claimant's eligi-
bility for benefits, the principal criterion in this third
stage of the sequential analysis remains the ability of an
applicant to engage in substantial gainful activity. The
attempt of the Congress in the 1967 Amendments to the
Social Security Act to give a final precise definition to
131
this concept has apparently not succeeded. There was a
consensus among the DDU administrators interviewed that the
attempt to use the national economy as a standard for the
determination of the availability of substantial gainful
work has not proved successful. Nearly all of them agreed
that this particular rule is simply not realistic and con-
sequently, is not followed in making decisions. A director
of a DDU noted that the national economy standard is of
"no consequence" and that only opportunities for employment
in the immediate region are relevant to the DDU decision-
makers in his state. One regional representative went even
further than this and contended that the "area of the state
where the applicant resides" is the appropriate geographic
area to consider in determining the availability of sub-
stantial gainful employment for a claimant.
There were exceptions to this lenient attitude,
however, as in the case of one DDU director, who apparently
decided to interpret the statute literally and thus insisted
upon denying claimants' benefits if substantial gainful
activity for which they are suited is available in their
region or in the national economy in general. He argued that
the disability program is essentially an insurance program
and not simply a "social welfare" type program. Interviews
in another DDU elicited a difference of opinion among two of
the administrators on this issue. One insisted upon using
the "national economy" standard and denying claims to those
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persons for whom jobs are available somewhere in the country,
while the other argued that "concern about his state" dic-
tated a policy in which the conditions in the claimant's
own state would be taken into consideration. This difference
of opinion among administrators interviewed suggests that the
state agencies have the opportunities to transform the rules
and regulations of the disability program when they do not
consider them to be applicable in a "realistic" way to the
1 ?facts of the situation in their own states.
Regardless of the geographic area involved, the dis-
ability examiners must still decide whether there is sub-
stantial gainful work available which the claimant can per-
form. To assist the examiner, the Directory of Occupational
Titles (DOT), which lists the types of jobs theoretically
present in a particular state or region, is available for
the adjudicator's use. Opinions of the respondents differ,
however, on the usefulness of the DOT as a realistic indica-
tor of the availability of substantial gainful work in a
particular region, and on its proper place among the criteria
for determining whether claimants should receive disability
insurance. The varying attitudes of the administrators
interviewed on tliis subject can be illustrated by discussing
the views of two DDU administrators in the same agency. One
^^For a comprehensive study of the problem of
administrative discretion in regard to rules and regula-
tions, cf. Henry J. Friendly, The Federal Administrative
A gen cies (Cambridge, Mass.: Flarvard University Press, 1962).
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examiner insisted that, although the "national economy"
standard is being ignored, the DOT manual is followed very
closely in determining whether there are jobs available
which a claimant with a particular level of residual function
al capacity can perform. He explained that if the listings
included jobs which a claimant can theoretically perform,
then this constituted proof that opportunities for SGA
are available. This particular perspective was echoed in
other DDU agencies, but wide variance among the states in
levels of awards and denials and the fact that such socio-
economic variables as employment status and ethnicity account
for a portion of the variance in the dependent variable,
lead one to question the accuracy of this view.
An interview with a supervisor in that same agency
elicited the conclusion from the respondent that there is
"extreme discretionary power" in the hands of the examiners.
He stressed that he instructs his examiners to ascertain the
feasibility of a disability claimant obtaining a job in
competition witli a non-disabled person. Furthermore, he
stated that examiners have to empathize with the employers
doing tlie hiring of disabled persons and try to determine
the realistic prospects of the claimant being hired. This
supervisor felt that benefits should be given in borderline
situations, because the job of the examiner is to serve the
claimant while still working within the framew'ork of rules
and regulations of the program. As this supervisor phrased
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it: "Is it really feasible for this person (i.e., a disability
insurance claimant) to compete with an average person applying
for a job?" His answer was that it is probably not reason-
able and therefore a certain amount of flexibility is needed.
This type of attitude is also discerned in the res-
ponses of a number of other administrators interviewed. The
Director of one DDU
,
for example, emphasized the importance
of transferrable skills in a "practical" sense, i.e., the
reasonableness of a particular person (of particular age,
educational background, etc.) finding another lob, given
the types of employment opportunities available. One region-
al representative noted the example of a claimant with a
"significant impairment" who was 55 years of age with six
years of education, and not able to transfer his skills. He
stated that this type of claimant would receive benefits,
even though there might be "theoretical" jobs listed in the
DOT vv'hich the claimant could perform.
This latitude in interpreting the statutes pre-
scribing the rules and regulations for the implementation
of the program was certainly not the intention of the legis-
lators. It is clear from the preceding discussion that
strict guidelines do not preclude the state DDU administrators
from allowing their own subjective judgments to dictate the
operative standards that will be utilized in determining the
eligibility of claimants to disability benefits, especially
in the third stage of the sequential analysis where medical
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considerations are not the only principal criteria. These
findings, however, do support the principal hypothesis of
this thesis, that the states, and in particular the state
political systems, do play an active role in guiding the
implementation of this totally federally funded program,
even if this means giving personal interpretation to
some of the regulations to make them conform to what, in the
judgment of individual DDU administrators, is the most
practical solution to problem areas within their respective
states
.
The search for reasons to explain this variability
in the administrative implementation of the Disability Insur-
ance program is not exhausted by demonstrating the flexi-
bility of regulations as applied by the examiners. This
situation merely sets the context in which other causal
factors, more directly related to the state DDU adminis-
trators, may operate. As stated in the hypotheses at the
beginning of the thesis (see Hypothesis Seven-e on page 5,
Chapter I), it is epxected that the degree of professional-
ism of the administrators in the state DDU ' s will partially
explain the variability in the percentage of benefit award
rates among the states. In this particular case, profes-
sionalism was further analyzed into factors such as background
and qualification of examiners and length of service of
examiners within the DDU ' s
.
The DDU director himself determines the method of
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recruitment for examiners in each of the states. Qualifica-
tions required of new examiners vary from state to state.
In one DDU
,
for example, examiners must have earned a B. A.
degree and have three to five years of experience in related
fields. Respondents indicated that only a "few" of the
examiners are selected from civil service lists, i.e., by
way of the merit system. Newspaper ads and unemployment
security offices seem to be the principal means of recruiting
new examiners in this particular state. One supervisor in
this particular DDU indicated that his examiners were largely
teachers, clergymen, and social workers.
Another DDU director indicated that common sense
experience of "learning from the world of experience" was
much more important than formal education for this particular
type of job that examiners perform. Although the required
experience in his agency at one time was a B. A. degree and
two years of experience, presently it consists of possessing
a high school diploma and six years of experience, two of
which are in the DDU itself. The director noted that in
this manner clerical staff can be appointed to positions of
examiners if they are qualified.
At the other extreme of the spectrum is at least one
DDU, where examiners must have earned not only a B. A.
degree in behavioral or related science, but also must attain
a M. A. degree within three years of their appointment.
Furthermore, this DDU operates completely within the state
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merit system, and all of its selections are approved by
the State Department of Education, the controlling unit of
the DDU.
Finally, in the Mid-West, only one state requires
that administrators possess an M. A. degree, and then only
in the case of supervisors of examiners. In one instance,
there exists a "career candidate entry system" through
which candidates with qualifications for potential jobs as
examiners are selected. The criteria for screening candi-
dates, however, are stipulated by the director of the DDU.
This state by state fluctuation in the manner of
selection and in the prescribed qualifications for new
examiners may account for some of the variation among the
states in the percentages of disability insurance benefit
awards. It is interesting to note in this regard that
disability award levels for three states show an inverse
relationship to the level of professionalism of the DDU
examiners, determined on the basis of their manner of selec-
tion and qualifications at the time of hiring. One state,
with comparatively low educational standards for examiners,
has the highest allowance rate of the three states, whereas
another, with the strictest qualifications has the lowest
award rates. The third state is in the middle both in
terms of award levels and the level of qualifications for
new examiners.
Together v;ith the variables of qualifications and
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means of selection of examiners, the length of experience
of the typical examiner in a DDU may be an important causal
factor in exp laining the variance in dis ab i 1 i ty award rates
among the states. For example, the director of one DDU
stated that his staff consisted primarily of "trainees,"
that he had no "trained" adjudicators and had not had any
in the past. This rather ameteurish operation may well be
a reason for the comparatively high percentage of disability
awards given in this state. Likewise, in another state
with high disablity award rates, examiners were said to be
"mostly inexperienced," i.e., with one year or less of
experience in the DDU. (Qualifications for examiners in this
particular state consist of having a B. A. degree, with no
practical experience necessary.) One regional representative
suggested that states vary in award rates in part because of
the length of experience of examiners in the DDU ' s . He
noted that about 60 percent of the examiners in his region
have less than one year of experience on the job and argued
that this is likely to influence the kinds of determinations
rendered by examiners.
The age and social attitudes of examiners are further
factors which may have a bearing on the kinds of judgments
made by disability examiners in the DDU ' s . One DDU adminis-
trator suggested that many of the younger examiners are more
aivare of such phenomena as the "black liberation movement"
and the problems of "poverty" and are therefore more likely
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to be quite liberal in decisions to allow disability benefits
to claimants. One of the examiners in another DDU admitted
taking into account questions of ethnicity and race when
determining whether a claimant with a "significant impairment"
can perform substantial gainful activity.
Although all of these responses of administrators
interviewed concerning the qualifications, experience, and
attitudes of disability insurance examiners are fragmentary
at best, they do afford one the opportunity to see the
importance of the DDU administrator in the actual implementa-
tion of the Disability Insurance program. The state DDU
agencies do differ in the degree of professionalization of
their operations, and it is reasonable to conclude that this
variability accounts for some of the differences in the per-
centages of disability insurance benefit awards among the
states
.
The bulk of the above analysis of the role of the
DDU's in the administrative implementation of the program
has centered on the decision-making process, and on the impor-
tance of the examiners in determining the types of decisions
made in terms of awards and denials of disability benefits.
It is appropriate now, however, to set this analysis in the
context of a discussion of the DDU's within the federal - state
administrative structure in which they function. Because of
the manner of the implementation of the Disability Insurance
program, the DDU's find themselves in a rather ambiguous
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position, administering a federal program but situated
within a state administrative structure. Although, as one
regional representative emphasized, the federal offices
"maintain their interest in every conceivable way," there is
a necessary element of negotiation since "appropriate super-
vision" over the DDU's must be tempered with sensitivity to
the viewpoint of the states. He commented further that
the "states are not our branch offices" and that the adminis-
trative arrangements between the federal and state agencies
"is an awkward system." This "awkward system" is of course
in actuality the phenomenon of cooperative federalism and
the following problem areas will be discussed in this context.
The most significant points of controversy in regard
to the position of the DDU's are those of personnel and
budgetary policy in the agencies and relationships between
the DDU’s and the vocational rehabilitation offices to which
the former are normally subordinated in the state adminis-
trative structures. The principal problem areas of personnel
policy are those of the number, salaries, and classification
status of persons working in the DDU's. Each aspect of this
particular area of policy manifests the active role of the
states in the im.plementat ion of a federal policy within a
cooperative federal system.
The maintenance of or increase in the number of per-
sonnel in a DDU is a function of the need to stabilize or to
expand the program in the states in order to provide adequate
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services to claimants. The policy decisions in terms of new
personnel are made by the federal authorities; but, because
the DDU ' s function within state administrative networks, the
state legislatures and executives must approve any proposals
for new personnel. According to persons interviewed within
the DDU ' s , the states do not automatically assent to the
wishes of the federal or DDU administrators. Decisions to
contravene the plans of the federal Bureau of Disability
Insurance (BDI) or a regional office to expand the program
in a particular state are made, even though no costs were
to be incurred by the states, since the program is completely
federally funded. One DDU director, for example, noted that
his state vetoed the authorization by the regional office of
an administrative assistant, determining that it was an
unnecessary addition of personnel. Administrators in
another DDU stated that the major problems they encountered
in their relations with the state governments were precisely
in this area of the acquisition of new personnel and replace-
ment of retired personnel. A DDU director remarked that
the "political climate" of a state can influence the atti-
tudes of legislators and governors in instituting personnel
ceilings which will affect the size of the DI program in a
particular state.
Two other aspects of personnel policy include
salaries and classification status of personnel in the DDU's,
Here the presence of the states is even more pronounced,
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since the federal administrators have virtually no voice in
these kinds of decisions. Opinions among the administrators
interviewed differed over the extent of the problems in '
this area. Some claimed that they were non-existent, and
others complained that, although they were part of a federal
program, their salaries and classification status were
completely determined by the states and that as a consequence
they were not equal to their federal counterparts.
Closely associated with the problems of personnel
policy are those of budgetary policy. Here again, one finds
a situation in which the federal authorities may propose
a level of spending in the DDU ' s , but in which the states
have an opportunity to decide whether or not to approve the
requests. States which have instituted "austerity” measures
may include budgetary items of the DDU’s within their
attempts to control spending. In terms of the operations
of the DDU ' s , the states can control the salaries of the
personnel, the total amount of money available for salaries
(thus determining the number of personnel that a DDU will
have at any particular time)
,
and also funds available for
equipment and other expenditures essential to the operation
of the DDU’s. Furthermore, budgetary procedures must be
followed according to state regulations, such as "line-item"
budgeting; thus a state may delete a particular item if it
so chooses, even though it does not have to appropriate
of the funds for the DDU budget.
any
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One of the potentially most controversial aspects
of the relationships of the DDU ’ s with the states concerns
the former’s relationships with the Vocational Rehabilitation
agencies to which they are normally subordinated in the
state administrative structure. Complaints from those
administrators interviewed focus upon the faulty understandings
of vocational rehabilitation people concerning the purposes
and regulations of the Disability Insurance program. One
DDU director, for example, stated that his office is "buried"
under state agencies and people who do not understand the
responsibilities of the DDU. He noted that his agency is
subordinated to the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation,
the Department of Social and Rc-habilitation Services, and the
Human Services Agency. In another case, the administrative
organization is such that the DDU is subordinated to the
Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, which in turn is part
of the State Department of Education. As the director of
this DDU explained, the Vocational Rehabilitation office is
"so much larger than the DDU, they are overwhelmed," and
furthermore the vocational rehabilitation people do not under-
stand the mission of the DDU. In the opinion of this DDU
director, his agency is considered a "step child" under the
control of the parent state agency.
These areas of controversy, emanating from the fact
that the DDU ' s are situated within state administrative
structures, tend to support the previous analysis concerning
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the role of the DDU examiners in explaining variance in the
percentage of disability benefit awards to claimants. The
individual states do have opportunities to affect the mode
of operation of the Disability Insurance program within their
j ur isdict ions
.
Summary
The discussion in this chapter has demonstrated the
fruitfulness of the systems framework as an analytical model
at an important juncture in the analysis, i.e., in deter-
mining the impact of the general political system institu-
tions and the role of the DDU administrators on the vari-
ability in the percentage of disability benefit awards
among the states. Following the conclusions of others that
notions such as "partnership" and "negotiated coordination"
were descriptive of the relationships between state and
federal political systems in implementing public policies,
it seemed appropriate to hypothesize that state political
systems would exert an influence upon the disability awards
dependent variable. It was suggested that the most relevant
quality in each of the major political institutions discussed
here, legislative, executive, and administrative, seemed to
be professionalism. Political innovation was added as a
fourth variable, another indicator of professionalism in
state political systems.
The analysis indicated that these general political
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system variables were quire useful in accounting for variance
in the levels of disability benefit awards among the states.
The total variance explained by these variables was 29 per-
cent, with administrative professionalism alone accounting
for 16 percent of this variance. It was followed by guber-
natorial effectiveness (7 percent) and political innovation
(6 percent) . The legislative professionalism variable did
not prove to be statistically significant. These results
showed that professionalism in the administrative and
executive institutions of the state political systems
^
those
nearest the actual operations of the DDU’s,were most signifi-
cant in explaining the variance in the dependent variable.
The statistical analysis was given substantial
support by the case studies of the operations of several
state Disability Determining Units (DDU’s), by way of inter-
views with DDU personnel and regional representatives of
the federal Bureau of Disability Insurance (BDI) . An
analysis of the decision-making process in the DDU ' s , the
so-called "sequential analysis," indicated that legislative
amendments, and administrative rules and regulations do not
preclude state DDU administrators using their own judgment
in deciding disability benefit award cases. In those
instances where medical factors are not the sole determinant
of an award or denial decision, the DDU examiners do indeed
interpret the regulations and apply them to particular cases.
In order to determine whether a claimant can engage in sub-
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stantial gainful activity, the examiners have to determine
the "residual functional capacity" of the claimant, and to
decide, on the basis of the claimant's age, educational
background, and his previous work experience, whether or not
he is presently employable.
In this decision-making process, the statutory and
administrative rules function as a context within which the
administrator must operate, but they do not preclude him
from selectively applying the regulations when he thinks that
the situation demands it. In regard to the 1967 amendment
to the Social Security Act, indicating explicitly that the
"national economy" was to be the area in which substantial
gainful activity sliould be sought for a claimant, many
administrators have simply refused to look beyond their own
states in ascertaining whether or not there is employment
available which a claimant could perform. Furthermore, the
Directory of Occupational Titles (DOT)
,
the guide to the
jobs which are theoretically available in a state, in many
instances has not been used by DDU examiners because it is
not considered a realistic indicator of the availability
of jobs which a claimant could really perform or for which
he would be realistically employable.
When reasons were sought to explain the existence of
these rather flexible operating standards for determining
whether or not claimants would be granted disability benefits,
the major explanatory variable again seemed to be profession-
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alism. Moreover, it was discovered that the background and
qualification of examiners and length of service of examin-
ers within the DDU’s varied sufficiently to suggest that
professionalism was directly related to the specific per-
centages of disability benefit awards in the states. There
was also some evidence to indicate that age and social
attitudes of the DDU administrators may have an impact upon
the types of decisions made. Although these findings point
to a situation which clearly differs from the intended mode
of operation of the program, it is nevertheless congruent
with the theoretical formulations of Grodzins and Elazar
on the nature of the federal operation in the United
States. Tliat their notions of ’'partnership” and "negotiated
coordination” apply even in this completely federally
funded program is further evident from the discussion of
the relationships of the DDU's with the state political
systems. In the areas of personnel policy, budgetary
matters, and relationships with the state Vocational
Rehabilitation Agencies, to which the DDU's are usually
subordinated in the state administrative organizations,
the presence of the states as a factor in the mode of
operation of the program was evident. Thus, the findings
presented in this chapter have tended to confirm and reen-
force the conclusions from Chapters II through V, that the
states do play an active role in the American federal system
even in policy areas where their involvement might not be
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initially expected 13
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CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this thesis has been to study the
operation of the Disability Insurance program within the
context of American federalism. Since this program is com-
pletely federal- funded and one in which the states do not
have a primary role in formulating substantive policy, as
they do in the more typical grant-in-aid programs, this
study has provided an opportunity to investigate the role
of the states in a policy area in which their principal
function is simply the administration of the program, with
the major policy decisions, administrative rules and regula-
tions having been formulated at the federal level. The
purpose of the disability insurance policy has been to pro-
vide insurance benefits to claimants who qualify under the
provisions of the program and, as a corollary to this, to
insure that the program is administered in a uniform manner
among the states. It was assumed that variance in the
percentages of claimants granted insurance benefits among the
states would be minimal and be related only to wdiether or
not they met the explicit standards of the program in regard
to severity of disability and unemployability because of
minimal "residual functional capacity" to engage in "sub-
stantive gainful activity."
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An important feature of this program, in terms of
its administrative framework, is the fact that state adminis-
trative agencies, the Disability Determining Units (DDU's),
have a key role in its implementation. It is the adminis-
trators within these agencies who make the actual decisions
concerning who will receive disability benefits. This study
proceeded from the assumption that this arrangement has
resulted in an extension of state influence over the Dis-
ability Insurance program far beyond the original intentions
of the policy makers who established this program and, indeed,
in spite of the efforts of federal administrators to main-
tain a uniform program.
In order to determine the validity of this assump-
tion, a number of hypotheses were advanced to be tested by
the analysis in Chapters Two through Five. These hypotheses
included references to the proposed importance of the federal
system in which the states function as semi - autonomous
polities, playing active roles in the formulation and
implementation of most major policies; to the history of
the development of the Social Security programs in general
and to the Disability Insurance program in particular as
illustrations of the impact of the states; to the socio-
economic environments of the state political systems; to
the input and political system characteristics themselves;
and finally to the role of the DDU’s in the implementation
of the Disability Insurance program. All of these variables
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were considered to be potential factors in pointing to the
impact of the states on the administration of this particu-
lar policy.
In order to present this material in a coherent
manner, a suitable analytical framework had to be selected.
After discussing a number of potentially useful models, the
systems framework was chosen, since it seemed to be the most
fruitful in terms of comprehensiveness, permitting the above-
mentioned hypotheses to be categorized in terms of environ-
mental, input, and political system characteristics which
might have an impact upon the actual implementation of the
program. The socio-economic, input, and political system
variables were discussed in Chapters Four, Five and Six
respectively. This analysis was prefaced, however, by two
chapters devoted to a discussion of the environmental context
of federalism in theory and in practice, using the develop-
ment of the Disability Insurance program as a case-study.
One of the most significant aspects of the political
system in the United States is its federal character,
exemplified in multifaceted negotiated coordination that
constitutes the basic element of any federal political system.
During the past two decades, political scientists have
worked to develop a theory of federalism in operation,
moving away from the older, more legalistic perspective
that tended to focus upon the dual nature of the federal and
This either-or conception of levelsstate political systems.
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of government, in which the federal and state governments
did not both operate in any single policy area but confined
themselves to different areas of erdeavor, had proven to be
unsatisfactory. Scholars such as Morton Grodzins and Daniel
Elazar suggested a more flexible theory of the operation of
the federal system, one that would take into consideration
the points of contact and the overlapping of functions of
the federal and state political systems. According to this
theory of overlapping functions, the state and federal politi-
cal systems undertake few major programs that do not involve
the other as an active partner at least in the formulation
of the policy and usually also in the actual implementation
of the programs
.
Within this framework one of the major purposes of
research has been that of elucidating the role of the states
in the primarily federal programs and the federal government
in the state programs. The third chapter of the thesis, on
the development of the Social Security grant-in-aid and
insurance programs in general and the Disability Insurance
program in particular, afforded ample opportunity to illus-
trate the validity of the hypotheses of Grodzins, Elazar,
and others. A common denominator in the administration of
most of these programs was the impact of the states in obtain-
ing active roles for themselves in their implementation.
This applied with special effect to the establishment of the
Disability Insurance program in 1957. Although the federal
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Bureau of Disability Insurance (within the Social Security
Administration) was charged with creating the network of
admin i strative rules and regulations and other enforcement
controls to insure uniformity in the administration of the
program, state administrative agencies (i.e., the Disability
Determining Units) were assigned the duties of making the
actual decisions about who would receive disability benefits.
Viewed through the perspective of the systems
framework, the discussion of the nature of the federal
system and the history of the background of the development
of the Disability Insurance program could serve as a context
within which to insert the analysis of the more immediate
influences on the variance in the implementation of the pro-
gram among the states. This federal context is very impor-
tant, however, and it functions as a crucial environmental
influence on the actual operations of the state political
systems. This became more clear in the analysis of the
impact of the political system, and in particular of the
DDU's, on the variance in the disability program among the
states in Chapter Six.
In Chapters Four through Six, the analysis followed
closely the systems analytical framework, using its central
categories of "environment,” "inputs," "political system,"
and "outputs" to order the presentation of the findings.
Before proceeding with the analysis of the varying impacts
of the socio-economic, input, and political system variables,
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however, it became necessary to specify more clearly the
actual content of the dependent variable. It was defined
as the ratio between the awards and denials of disability
insurance benefits among the states in 1970 or, more
simply, the percentages of benefit awards among the states
for that year.
Given the explicit goals of the Disability Insurance
program and the complex means for review of state DDU's
decisions, it was certainly not evident a priori that there
was great variation among the states in the manner of the
implementation of the program. To be sure, the analysis of
federalism and the history of the development of the dis-
ability program had given some indication that this might
well be the case. However, more specific evidence was needed
to establish that there was indeed a legitimate output
"variable" existent.
Statistics on the award and denial rates of state
DDU's for 1970 confirmed the assumption about the existence
of wide variance from state to state. For that year,
according to the figures issued by the Bureau of Disability
Insurance (BDI)
,
the ratio of awards to denials varied from
41 percent to 71 percent among the states, with the mean at
52 percent. The accuracy of these statistics was confirmed
by those presented in a Staff Report of the House Committee
on Ways and Means on the Disability Insurance Program, which
indicated that for 1970, the range of disability benefit
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deni al
5
was from 28 percent to 60 percent, with the mean at
44.7 percent, thus complementing rather well the statistics
derived from BDI on the variance in the award rates among
the states. These figures were sufficient to indicate that
variance indeed did exist in the implementation of the dis-
ability insurance program among the states.
Following the outline of the systems framework, the
analysis turned first of all to a number of socio-economic
environmental variables in order to discover some of the
causes for the discrepancy between the explicit goals of the
program and its actual operation. Theoretically, it was
assumed, some socio-economic characteristics might be the
primary causal factors in explaining the variance in the
dependent variable. Variables such as per capita income,
level of industrial development, and level of urbanization
had proven to be fruitful predictors of levels of welfare
expenditures among the states. In the case of the Disability
Insurance program, however, the peculiar design of the pro-
gram with its principal criterion of incapacitating dis-
ability had to be used in determining how the specific socio-
economic variables should be categorized in terms of their
relationships to the variance in the percentages of dis-
ability benefit awards among the states. This proved to be
rather complicated since, in the course of the development
of the program, medically determined disability as the princi-
pal criterion had been supplemented by an "equivalent to
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criterion and by such factors as education and work experience
if those prevented a claimant from pursuing "substantial
gainful activity." These additional criteria suggested the
possibility that benefits might be given occasionally on the
basis of "need," even though a disability might not be so
severe as to warrant an allowance decision. Therefore, in
using socio-economic characteristics as one of the probable
primary causal factors in determining the level of benefit
awards among the states, the purpose was both to determine
whether these types of variables did in fact account for any
variance and further to ascertain what specific character-
istics would have the most impact upon the dependent variable
The results of this analysis gave substantial evi-
dence to support the assumption about the active role of the
states in this program. When the socio-economic character-
istics were correlated with the dependent disability variable
the findings indicated that they explained (statistically)
64 percent of the variance in the levels of disability bene-
fit awards among the states. Although this was a substantial
portion of the variance in the dependent variable, it was
considerably less than one could have legitimately expected,
since the disability program was intentionally designed to
preclude any determinants other than socio-economic factors
from influencing the attempt at a uniform administration of
tiie prograii'i among the states. This finding opened up still
further the possibility that other factors, such as "input"
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characteristics, political system characteristics, or the
DDU ' s themselves, were having a decisive impact on the
variance o-f^ disability benefit allowances among the states.
Even more important than the specific amount of
variance explained, however, were findings concerning the
types of variables which contributed most to this 64 percent
explanatory variance. When the variables were classified
according to their expected relationships to the dependent
variable, three main categories were proposed: (1) for
variables which should show relationships with the disability
award variable; (2) for variables about which there was some
discrepancy in according them "legitimate" status in being
associated with the percentage of awards among the states;
and (3) for variables which definitely should manifest no
relationships to the dependent variable.
The results of the analysis determined that the major
proportion of the variance explained was contributed by the
third category of socio-economic variables - -migration status,
employment status, income status, and spatial status, those
which should have indicated no relationship with the depen-
dent disability benefit awards variable. They accounted for
46 percent of the 64 percent of the variance explained by the
socio-economic characteristics. Migration status and employ-
ment status were most significant, explaining 28 percent and
12 percent of the variance respectively. These findings
reduced even further any expectations about discovering uni-
formity in the implementation of the disability program and
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also about its being administered solely as an insurance
program rather than, at least in part, as a "needs” program
similar to the typical (i.e., before the establishment of
the SSI programs in 1974) welfare-oriented programs.
Partial confirmation of these conclusions was pre-
sented through the analysis of the variables in the second
category, ethnicity, education, and race, which had an
ambiguous relationship to the dependent variable. They
contributed 18 percent to the total explained variance, with
ethnicity (10 percent) being the predominant contributor.
It must be remembered that there is a certain ambiguity con-
cerning the legitimacy of the relationships between these
socio-economic characteristics and the variance in the per-
centages of disability benefit awards. Even if one were to
grant, Iiow^ever, that they should correlate without question
with the dependent variable, the percentage of the variance
which they explained would not lessen the impact of those
variables in the third category w’-hich definitely should not
have had an impact on the aw'arding of allowances, according
to the program design. The only variable which w^as classi-
fied in the first category, median age of the population,
proved ironically to be statistically insignificant.
Follow'ing the systems framework, it was appropriate
to focus next upon the "input" characteristics as potential
explanatory variables. Since inputs represent demand and
supports being brought into the political system from the
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environment and thus necessitating responses from the
system decision-makers within the limits of the resources
available to them, it was assumed that input characteristics
would have some impact upon the variance of the disability
benefit award rates among the states. The three input
variables selected for this study were inter-party competi-
tion, voting turnout, and interest group strength in the
states. Together they explained 14 percent of the variance
in the disability award rates, with voting turnout con-
tributing 10 percent and the interest group variable four
percent of the total variance. The inter-party competition
variable was not statistically significant. As stated in
the analysis in Chapter V, the predominant impact of the
voting turnout variable was a logical outcome, since it is
less rentote than the other two variables in representing a
direct measure of the participation of citizens and their
predispositions to express their wants and needs through the
input channels into the political system.
The results of the input analysis pointed with
greater sureiiess to the importance of the states in ascer-
taining the reasons for the wide variance in the disability
allowance levels. Even though the variance explained by
the input characteristics is relatively small (14 percent)
and no direct cause and effect associations with the
dependent variable were hypothesized, it seemed appropriate
nevertheless to speak of "climates" provided by the input
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chsractcrist ics which might be conducive to varying levels
of disability benefit awards among the states. Combined
with the conclusions gleaned from the analysis of socio-
economic variables in Chapter Four, the findings in this
chapter gave greater credence to the hypothesis that the
states do play a substantial role in determining how this
federal program will be administered within their juris-
dictions .
The sixth chapter of the thesis shifted the analysis
to the state political systems themselves, and to the DDU ' s
within the state administrative structures in particular,
in order to focus more directly upon those structures which
were deemed likely to have a decisive impact upon the vari-
ance in the granting of disability benefit allowances among
the states. Both the theoretical systems framework and the
conclusions of political scientists on the nature of the
American federal system pointed to the importance of the
political system actors in making those decisions which
"allocate values" for the whole society.
Moreover, the previous analysis in the thesis had
consistently pointed to the possibility of state, and in
particular state-administrative, influence on the implementa-
tion of the program. The second chapter suggested that the
major premise of recent research on the federal system was
that "partnership" and "negotiated coordination" were the
fundamental, essential qualities of American federalism.
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The validity of these conclusions was illustrated in the
historical developmental analysis of the Disability Insur-
ance program, in which it was shown that the states did
indeed have some impact upon the decisions relating to the
formulation and implementation of the program. The analysis
in Chapter IV was crucial to the evaluation of the primary
hypothesis (i.e., that the states do indeed have an impact
on the implementation of this federal - funded program), since
there was a theoretical possibility that certain socio-
economic characteristics might have "legitimately,” i.e.,
within the framework of the program design, accounted for
all the variance in the benefit allowance rates among the
states. This did not prove to be the case, however, and those
socio-economic variables which were the most powerful pre-
dictors were in fact those which should have had no impact
upon the dependent variable. Furthermore, this finding
suggested the possibility that the states were making their
impact upon the program by transforming it, in at least some
instances, into a "needs" program in which the principal
criterion, medical disability, would be supplemented by
economic need. The input variable analysis once again
substantiated the assumption of the active role of the states
in the implem.ent ation of the program.
Tlius, in Chapter Six, the analysis reached a logical
cojicjuding point in its investigation of the role of the
political system and the DDU's in the implementation of the
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Disability Insurance program. In regard to the general
political system discussion, it was hypothesized that
professionalism would be the most pertinent characteristic
of the major political system institutions to indicate their
influence upon the variance in disability benefit allowance
rates among the states. Measurements of legislative, execu-
tive, and administrative professionalism were used together
with an additional professionalism indicator, political
innovation, to test the hypothesis. The analysis indicated
these variables were quite fruitful in predicting variance
in the dependent variable. Together they accounted for 29
percent of the variance in the benefit award percentages,
with administrative professionalism alone explaining 16 per-
cent of this variance. It was followed by gubernatorial
effectiveness (7 percent) and political innovation (6 per-
cent)
,
with the legislative professionalism variable proving
to be statistically insignificant. As important as the
percentage of variance explained, however, was the fact
that the most important predictors, administrative pro-
fessionalism and gubernatorial effectiveness, were those
most closely associated with the actual operations of the
DDU's within the state administrative structures.
The analysis of the attitudes and behavior of the
decis ion-mahers within the DDU’s presented the most detailed
and substantial support for the hypothesis concerning the
impact of the states on the implementation of the Disability
163
Insurance program. Obviously, in a completely federal-
funded program, in which the states do not have a primary
policy-making role, the center of state activity in the
program implementation must be located within the state
agencies which perform the specific administrative implement-
ing functions. Consequently, the DDU’s became a primary
focus for attention in order to determine whether or not the
indicators derived from the various sets of statistical
analyses would indeed prove to be accurate, that indeed the
state decision-makers were exerting an important influence
over the administration of the program. Previous discussion
had indicated that uniformity in program implementation was
only a goal and not an operational reality and furthermore
that in some instances, DDU administrators might wx'll have
been administering the program as a welfare-oriented "needs”
type of policy without explicit reference to the primary
criterion of medically ascertained disability so severe as
to prevent a claimant from engaging in substantial gainful
act ivi ty
.
The first part of the analysis centered on the actual
decision-making process, the so-called "sequential analysis,"
w^ithin which DDU’s administrators operate in making decisions
about each claim for benefit aivards. The three stages in
the decision-making process are concerned with the follov/ing
types of cases: (1) medically- ascertainable severe dis-
abilities v;hich can be categorized under one of the types
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of disability listed in the Handbook for Phvsicians; (2)
equivalent to" cases, i.e., disabilities whose combined
severity equal a specific listing n the Handbook
; and (3)
cases of moderately severe disability (about 60 to 70 per-
cent of the total number)
,
which do not meet the listings
in the Flandbook and which therefore require greater use of
the criteria of "residual functional capacity" and "sub-
stantial gainful activity" in order for disability examiners
to determine whether or not these claimants should receive
disability benefit awards.
Each of the successive stages in the decision-m.aking
process results in further complications and increasing room
for interpretation for examiners. Although respondents
agreed that the first stage of the sequential analysis is
quite routine, they noted that already in the second stage
there are the problems of "equivalency" of disabilities,
the need to consult physicians on doubtful cases, and the
determinations of residual functional capacity. The fact
that medical consultants do not at all times agree with one
another of the merits of particular cases adds a further
complication for the disability examiners.
It is in the third stage of the decision-making
process, however, where the majority of the disability cases
are found, that the clearest opportunities for differing
interpretations among examiners arise. Here examiners face
the most difficult decisions, because "residual functional
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capacity" and "substantial gainful activity" come to play
a role that is at least as significant as the medical
severity of the disability of the claimant. Consequently,
whether the disability program is administered uniformly
among the states as an insurance program or whether it is
transformed, at least partially, into a "needs" oriented
program will be decided at this stage in the decision-making
process. To be sure, statutory and administrative regula-
tions function as a context within which the administrator
must operate even at this stage of the sequential analysis.
However, they do not preclude him from selectively applying
the regulations when he thinks that the situation demands
it. Furthermore, if the standards are ambiguous or are
considered "unrealistic" by the DDU administrators, then
this only serves to compound the problems associated with
the notion of substantial gainful activity.
In Chapter Six, a short history of the controversy
over the problem of defining "substantial gainful activity"
was presented. It was noted there that a 1967 Congressional
amendment attempted to solve the problem by stipulating that
the "national economy" was to be the area in which SGA
might be sought for a claimant. However, it also specif ieo.
that factors such as "age," "education, y and "work
experi-
ence" should be taken into consideration in determining
whether or not a claimant could be expected to engage in
bstantial gainful employment. Both the problems ofsu
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"unrealistic” and ambiguous standards were manifested in this
attempt to clarify the notion of SGA, and this has conse-
quently affected the manner of implementation of the Dis-
ability Insurance program among the states.
In regard to the "national economy" standard, most
administrators in the DDU’s have simply refused to follow it
and have substituted their own particular states as the
proper location for determining the existence of substantial
gainful activity that a claimant could perform. Furthermore,
the seeming inability to define precisely such notions as
age, education, and previous work experience in an a priori
abstract manner has provided DDU examiners with the opportunity
of allowing benefits to be granted to claimants even if the
severity of their disability does not warrant such a decision.
As the analysis from the interviews indicated, some DDU
administrators seemed to be more concerned with whether
claimants would actually find employment than with the ques-
tion of their employability per se. This tension was
brought out in the discussion of the use of the Directory of
Occ\ipat ional Titles (DOT) by state disability examiners.
Many persons interviewed seemed to feel that this index of
the availability of various types of jobs in a state was
not very valuable because it was not a realistic indicator
of the availability of particular jobs which any particular
claimant could perform. Although no rigid conclusions are
warranted here, one must w'onder how^ lenient an administrator
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can become before an insurance oriented program, with strict
standards concerning the severity of disability as a criterion
for awarding of benefits, has been transformed into somethirg
that resembles more clearly a needs oriented program where
the issue is whether or not a claimant is actually employed.
The flexibility of administrative regulations, how-
ever, was only one factor in explaining the variability in
the implementation of the disability program among the states.
The professional quality of the administrators themselves
seemed to be another primary cause. The analysis showed that
background and qualification of examiners and length of
service of examiners with the DDU's varied sufficiently to
suggest that professionalism was directly related to the
specific percentages of disability benefit awards among the
states. Furthermore, there was some evidence to indicate
that age and social attitudes of the DDU administrators
might have an impact upon the types of decisions made.
The analysis of the role of the DDU administrators
in the implementation of the program thus has substantiated
the conclusions gleaned from the discussion in the earlier
chapters on the nature of federalism, the history of the
disability program, and the impact of socio-economic, input,
and general political system variables.^ Although conclusions
must be tentative because of the nature of the data, it would
seem that responses gained from those persons interviewed
have indicated strongly the active presence of the DDU
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administrators in determining the types of decisions that are
made in the implementation of the program and in many instan-
ces the specific criteria to be utilized in arriving at
specific decisions to award or to deny benefits to claimants.
This has proven to be true especially in the third stage of
the sequential analysis where flexibility of decision-making
standards and low degree of administrative professionalism
may combine to transform the explicit purposes of an insur-
ance program into a covert needs oriented policy.
Whatever the consequences for the integrity of the
Disability Insurance program, the substantial role of the
DDU's in the implementation of the disability program serves
only to indicate witli even greater force the importance of
the states in the operation of the American federal system.
Even beyond the actual impact of the state DDU’s on the vari-
ance in the percentage of disability benefit allowances, the
analysis in Chapter Six pointed to the areas of personnel
policy, budgetary matters, and relationships with the state
Vocational Rehabilitation Agencies and the DDU's, where
additional state influence could be brought to bear upon
the operation of the disability program in the states. It
would seem to be true indeed that "partnership" and "nego-
tiated coordination" are quite viable concepts in the analy-
sis of any major policy area, even one in which the states,
at first glance, do not seem to have a major role to play.
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